SAFE FILE: NETHERLANDS

TELEGRAM SENT

HSM
A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (C & Special Gray).

Amlegation,
The Hague, (Netherlands).

140.

ULTRA CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER ONLY.
The President desires you to convey, either directly
or through such discreet channels as you deem best, the
following personal (underline personal) and unofficial

The President desires you to convey, either directly or through such discreet channels as you deem best, the following personal (underline personal) and unofficial message to the Queen. He appreciates that under existing conditions it might prove embarrassing to Her Majesty if this message were to become known; it is therefore being treated here as highly confidential. Should developing circumstances seem to warrant publicity, this will be a matter for later consideration and discussion. Meanwhile in order to limit the number of persons who have knowledge of the message I suggest that Her Majesty may want to send her reply through you.

(BEGIN SPECIAL GRAY) QUOTE To Her Majesty Queen

I am thinking much of you and the House of Orange in these critical days, and it occurs to me that in the event

of

hsm -2- No. 140, November 11, 9 p. m., to The Hague

of the invasion of Holland you may care to have the Crown Princess and the children, or the latter by themselves, come to the United States temporarily to be completely safe against airplane raids. It would give Mrs. Roosevelt and me very great happiness to care for them over here as if they were members of our own family and they could come to us either in Washington or at our country place at Hyde Park.

I am telegraphing my old friend Leopold in regard to his own children and I want you to know that I want to help in any personal way which lies in my power.

Signed FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. UNQUOTE. (END SPECIAL GRAY)

HULL (PM)

Eu:PM

The Hague KLP Dated November 12, 1939. This telegram must be closely paraphrased be-Rec'd. 4:18 p.m. fore being communicated to anyone. (C) Secretary of State, Washington. 269, November 12, 4 p.m. Department's 140, November 11, 9 p.m., was only received here today. The Queen being engaged in continuous conferences cannot receive me until this evening when I personally will deliver the President's message. GORDON WK a49601

Safe: Motheran KLP The Hague Dated November 12, 1939. This telegram must be closely paraphrased be-fore being communicated Rec'd. 5:55 p.m. to anyone. (C) Secretary of State, Washington. 270, November 12, 10 p.m. My 269, November 12, 4 p.m. I have delievered the President's message to the Queen who requested me to convey her very warm appreciation thereof and to say that she would answer it at the Earliest opportunity. GORDON KLP 049c01

Safe: Netherland

HSM
A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (C).

The Hague
Dated November 13, 1939
Rec'd 2:35 p. m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

UNCLASCAMISO

271, November 13, 6 p. m.

SECRETARY.

My 270, November 12, 10 p. m.

The following is the text of the Queen's reply to the President's message: (BEGIN 3PECIAL GRAY)

"President of the United States, Washington.

Mr. Gordon will already have cabled how highly I appreciate the feelings for my people and my House which prompted your and Mrs. Roosevelt's kind offer for which I tender my heartfelt thanks and which I shall be very pleased to take into serious consideration should conditions become worse. Signed WILUELMINA R." (END SPECIAL GRAY).

GORDON

CSB

Sage: Netherland

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C).

The Hague
Dated November 14, 1939
Rec'd 9:52 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

273, November 14, noon.

STRICTLY CONFIDENCIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY.

My 269, November 12, 4 p. m.

Although I went to the Palace quite alone at 9:30 in the evening, the fact of my going there was published in the press of yesterday. It is just possible that someone in the Palace gave it out although it was agreed before my going there that nothing would be; it is more likely that one of the "death watch" of reporters stationed outside the Palace recognized my car.

In response to inquiries from the press yesterday

I merely stated that I could make no comment and upon my
informing the Foreign Office thereof it promised to do the
same.

Naturally

ひんじし こしいいかり

a49e01

hsm -2- No. 273, November 14, noon, from The Hague

Naturally the visit has occasioned lively interest, but as there are an infinite variety of matters on which I might have gone to see the Queen it occurs to me that the President and yourself may feel that on the whole speculation in certain quarters as to the actual purpose of my visit may be a rather useful thing.

GORDON

CSB

phr. of

Safe: Netherland

DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

April 15, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

In reply to your memorandum of April 15 concerning Gordon's telegram no. 112 in which he suggested a further message from you to Queen Wilhelmina, I enclose copy of a message which the Secretary sent yesterday morning in reply. With your statement on Saturday regarding the American attitude toward small nations, there can be no possible doubt of our moral position. The Netherlands Government has never before been hesitant in suggesting ways and means whereby we could be helpful. In the circumstances, the wisest course seemed to be to give Gordon authorization to ask for an audience, if the Dutch authorities intimated that this would be helpful, but not to take a further initiative ourselves at the moment.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure: Telegram no. 112,

from The Hague, April 13, 1940.

The President,

The White House.

TELEGRAM SENT

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C-1)

April 14, 1940

1 p.m.

AMLEGATION

THE HAGUE

RUSH.

45.

Your 112, April 13, 9 a.m., and 115, April 14, 1 p.m.

If the Netherlands Government, which is best able to judge the value of your audiences with the Queen during past crises, should on their own initiative suggest that a repetition would be useful, you are authorized to ask for an audience. Otherwise, I question the advisability of any initiative on our part.

HULL (CII)

S:CH

Eu: PM

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

The Hague
Dated April 13, 1940
Rec'd 7:15 a. m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

REGRADED UNCLASSIAS

TRIPLE PRIORITY

112, April 13, 9 a. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY.

The net result of this week's developments in their impact on the Netherlands is that the situation now gives every indication of being as serious as it was in the week of November 11; in other words, the country seems as close to the brink (*) German invasion as it can be without being actually engulfed. At two other critical moments—i.e., on November 12 and January 20—the mere fact of my having gone to see the Queen, even though no one knew what I discussed with her (and apparently all the more so for that very reason) had an effect which was undoubtedly highly beneficial and understand that the rumor is reportedly widespread in this and neighboring countries.

a49403

hsm -2- No. 112, April 13, 9 a. m., from The Hague countries. The effect, of course, was as the result greater on account of her marked inaccessibility.

I strongly hope that you may concur in the idea of suggesting to the President that he send me any (repeat any) kind of a message to convey personally to the Queen; I am convinced that it would be of great help and more-over that it would not be over-playing the same line or wasting any ammunition. If you approve of this proposal I may add that if I can be received by the Queen on a Sunday (i.e. tomorrow) the effect will be considerably heightened.

GORDON

HPD

(*) apparent omission

Lafe: notherlands This telegram must be THE HAGUE closely paraphrased be-fore being communicated Dated May 7, 1940 to anyone. Rec'd 9:09 p.m. Secretary of State. Washington. 146, May 7, 11 p.m. Please communicate the following immediately to the President. Department's instruction 321 of December 21 and its Enclosure. The Queen desires to know whether in the event that the Princess and her children should, either within or outside of the Netherlands, be cut off from and unable to communicate with the Queen, a request from the Princess or Prince Bernard in one of their own names for the despatch of a cruiser to take them and the children to the United States would have the same weight as a cimilar request on her own part. GORDON EMB a49901

Lafe: Whiteland

TELEGRAM SENT

CK
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated
to anyone. (C)

May 8, 1940

1 a. m.

AMERICAN LEGATION

THE HAGUE (NETHERLANDS)

UNCLASORA

RUSH

66,

Your 146, May 7, 11 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER

The President desires me to say that any request from the Princess Royal for the despatch of a cruiser will of course be regarded as equivalent to a request from the Queen herself. The President suggests that in the interest of the safety of the Princess and of her family it would be wise for them to consider travelling by way of France to Lisbon where this government has based at this present moment a cruiser which could transport the royal family to the United States.

Any ship in the channel is of course liable to air attack.

Please inform the Queen that the President in line with his previous message will do everything possible to assure the safety of the Princess's family in the event that an emergency arises.

WELLES (ACTING)

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

151, May 9, noon.

Department's 66, May 8, 1 a.m.

The Queen has requested that her warm appreciation of his message be conveyed to the President.

GORDON

NPL

Pres.

Jafe: Netherland

HSM This t

HSM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

London

Dated May 21, 1940

Rec'd 7:33 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

UNO_____

1294, May 21, noon.

My 1273. Hay 20, 4 p. m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT.

"Message of Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands to the President of the United States.

I am very grateful for your personal message which the Ambassador of the United States brought me this afternoon.

Your appreciation of the splendid resistance of my armed forces against overwhelming numbers of enemy troops deeply touched me. In this appreciation everyone will join who realizes the superhuman effort they made.

Your kind consideration of my personal welfare and that of my family is a great comfort to me in these days of stress. If circumstances should call for it--may God forbid its necessity--I will not fail to remember your generous initiative. (Signed) Wilhelmine, May 20th, 1940."

KENNEDY

Lafe: Netherland

JRL

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated May 28, 1940 Rec'd. 5:18 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

DNOL EUMILIO

RUSH

1414, May 28, 8 p.m.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY

The Dutch Foreign Minister has just called to see me.

He is still very unhappy that the British do not seem to be making any plans ahead for the possibilities that might arise and the Queen instructed him to come and say to me that she and the Prince have decided to remain here for further developments, but they do want Princess Juliana and the children to go to Canada. The reason they want her to go to Canada instead of the United States is because if anything should happen to the Queen she would have to function as the head of the government.

The Dutch Foreign Minister realizes that America cannot or would not want to send a cruiser or ship into belligerent waters so his suggestion is that the Princess and her two children on Triday night of this week be put on one of the Dutch cruisers which will

take

JRL 2 of 1414, May 28, 8 p.m., from London.

take her to meet any ship that you designate, which ship in turn might take her to Canada.

He realizes that this is a very difficult thing for you to work out, but that you have been so kind in your offers and suggestions that the Queen wished you to know what she would like to do at this minute, but she understands of course the difficulties in the situation for you.

"Will you advise me as soon as possible as they are anxious to make plans.

KENNEDY

NPL

Treo.

Parp

Safe: Nethaland

JT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

London
Dated May 30, 1941
Rec'd 9:03 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

NETHERLANDS SERIES 8, May 30, 2 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BIDDLE.

Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands informs me in strictest confidence that he plans to arrive in Canada about June 7 and plans to accompany Princess Juliana on a brief visit to Washington where he hopes to have the honor of paying his respects to the President before returning here.

JOHNSON

NPL



2:10 p.m.dl

From Department of State The Secretary, September 1 1941

The President In accordance with your instructions I am submitting the proposed draft of a reply to Queen Wilhelmina. If you approve the message can be sent by telegraph to London in the following form:

Wart. Safe: notherla.

September 1, 1941.

American Embassy, London.

For Ambassador Biddle.

Please deliver at earliest moment the following message from the President to Queen Wilhelmina:

"Your Majesty's gracious letter is appreciated and I regret sincerely that matters of state prevent your visit to Hyde Park at this time. Mrs. Roosevelt and I cannot be but deeply disappointed but trust that your visit is only delayed.

"Your heavy responsibilities are fully appreciated yet since I may not have the pleasure of welcoming you to Hyde Park now, I wenture to raise in this message a matter of great mutual concern to your country and mine.

"This country secures from the Pauxite mines in Surinam two million tons of ore annually or 65 per cent of our total supply and if this supply were interrupted in any way it would most seriously delay the production of aircraft which are so urgently needed by all nations resisting argression.

"The information reaching me indicates that the Bauxite instal--ations in Surinam are at present inadequately protected and could be destroyed either by sabotage or by raiders approaching from land, sea, or air. In addition the transportation of the ore could be interrupted by sinking ships in the river approaches to the mines since these are the only avenues of egress for the ore.

"The situation is so grave that I turn to you direct in order that a way may be found for you and your Government to devise further means of protection. If you approve, I should be prepared, having in mind the Havana proceedure, to make arrangements for the immediate entry of several United States troops into Sprinam to remove the threat to this source of critical raw material. If this form of protection is agreed, I and any American associates will of course give you my formal assurance that occupation by American troops would be a temporary measure for the period of the emergency only and that they will be withdrawn as soon as the threat of damage to these vital mines is removed. The military forces involved will approximate a battalion of infantry, a battery of entiaircraft artillery together with the necessary aircraft and service troops. The total force should not exceed three thousand officers and men. They would be accompanied by suitable vessels to patrol the river approaches to the mines.

a49 k01

"I am confident you will realize that the situation requires immediate action, and while our preparations to move are being completed, we cannot go forward without the urgent reply of you and your government.

"The importance of secrecy is so great that I suggest the utmost precautions be taken to insure that no information is divulged until you and I are agreed in principle upon the course of action and subsequently upon the text of identical announcements. With this initiative upon our parts the details can be carried on by the appropriate officials of our respective governments.

"Mrs. Roosevelt's and my enjoyment of Princess Juliana and her husband's visit can only be exceeded by our anticipated pleasure in welcoming you at an early date in this country.

"Your friend.

Franklin D. Roosevelt."

F Lafe: netherland

TEM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

London

Dated September 3, 1941 Rec'd 12:15 p.m.

Secretary of State. Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

September 3, 4 p.m.

Netherlands series number 20.

FROM BIDDLE. SECRET-FOR THE PRESIDENT.

2003520, September 1, 4 p.m.

One. Message conveyed to Queen Wilhelmina at 11 a.m. this morning, and at her request, to Prime Minister Gerbrandy at 1 p.m.

Two. Gerbrandy will consult with the Queen this Evening and call Cabinet together Thursday morning on this matter. Immediately thereafter, he will notify me of decision taken.

Three. He revealed that a small Dutch force of three hundred men had already been ordered to Surinam; half from here and half from the East Indies. He felt that if the Government accepted your gracious offer, collaboration Kingdom forces could be readily effected.

Four. It was his belief that the Cabinet would render a favorable decision at tomorrow's meeting. Meanwhile, the Queen and he wishes to express to you their deep gratitude for your suggestion.

PSF Sal Heller

(SC) A16-1/EF48-1 Op-12-105

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Serial 0149212

WASHINGTON



December 20, 1941.

Momorandum for the President:

The attached memorandum of the Netherlands Minister, herewith returned, makes the following points:

> The Covernor Ceneral of the Matherlands Hast Indies has received no information from American Headquarters.

He stresses the importance of the supply of war materials to the Par Bast, and of a carefully coordinated defense.

He requests information as to the system used by the U.S. Havy in the protection of trans-Pacific Metherlands shipping.

Late in November the Navy Department was informed that the Governor General of the Metherlands East Indies had represented to the Minister here that he was not receiving information. Admiral Hart was directed on December 2nd to send pertinent information to the Dutch Haval Commander in Chief; the Chief of Haval Operations stated that he considered this important, and suggested that our naval observer in Batavia undertake the liaison. The Chief of Haval Operations also suggested the Dutch send a liaison officer to Admiral Hart in Hamila. Admiral Hart replied that a Dutch liaison officer had been in Manila for some time, and that he was constantly exchanging information with the Dutch naval Commander in Chief. Inquiry at the War Department establishes the fact that a military observer is stationed in Patavia. The War Department believes that all portinent information that the Commanding General, Army Torces in the Far Bast, desires to convey has been transmitted to the Governor General.

The subject of coordinated defense was long ago a subject of conversations at Singapore, at which the Dutch were represented. A conference with a similar purpose is now being held, or soon will be held, in Singapore.


DECLASSITED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

MARS D.A. 1073

a49m01



Admiral Glassford and Admiral Purnell are now in latavia. These officers are fully informed as to Admiral lart's plans, and it is certain that they have conveyed portinent information to the Metherlands Mast Indies authorities, and will make joint plans with them. Admiral Classford commands the U.S. Mavy surface vessels of the Asiatic Fleet, and one patrol bomber squadron. His force now comprises 2 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 5 gunboats, several minesweepers, and 5 aircraft, destroyer, and submarine tenders. His surface vessels lack fighter aircraft defense, and can not operate in areas where dominated by enemy air strength. They are now in the Metherlands Mast Indies, operating against the probability of penetration of this area by Japanese naval forces.

Admiral Hart is in Manila, using his submarines in support of the defense of the Philippines, and offensively against energy naval forces. How much longer the submarines can base at Manila is problematical. If the submarine base must be shifted from Manila, Admiral Mart has been advised to operate from the Motherlands Mast Indies in support of the defense of Luzon, in support of the defense of the Metherlands Mast Indies, and in attacks on Jamenese vessels attempting to obtain oil from Porneo. His eventual retirement base would be Port Darwin. He has been directed to convey this information to the British and the Dutch. The Army andlavy are making every effort to provide logistic support for the Philippines. Troops, aircraft, and material now en route will be used for this purpose. But if the Commanding General, Army Porces in the Far Mast, finds his sea and air communications cut, these reinforcements will be available for the defense of the Metherlands East Indies, Australia, and New Zealand.

The principal protection of shipping across the Pacific to the Netherlands East Indies is by the choice of routes that at the time appear safest. There are not enough men-of-war to escort all vessels on the routes across the Pacific, though troop convoys must be escorted. An alternative is the route around the Cape of Good Hope.

The Hetherlands Haval Attache in Mashington has been informed that the United States naval authorities would be glad to furnish "routings" to Dutch vessels departing U.S. ports. The suggestion was also made that the Hetherlands Haval Attache request routings from the British Haval Control Service Organization in other than United States ports.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

B. RT. NARN Date PR 6 1973

-2-

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

December 17, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

What should be done about this? Please return enclosure.

F. D. R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

December 16, 1941

Memorandum for The President

Attached is a copy of a memorandum handed me today by the Netherlands Minister.

C.H.

MEMORANDUM

No news or information is being received by the Governor General of the Netherlands Indies as Commander in Chief, from American Head Quarters.

The Governor General is of the opinion that for a successful prosecution of the war it is most essential that the front in South East Asia should strongly be maintained. The fall of strongholds in Malacca, the Philippine Islands Netherlands Indies, mandated territories, New Zealand and Australia, would not only cause a considerable protraction of the war but would also make the final outcome doubtful.

It is therefore essential that not only the closest military collaboration and coordination should exist between the participants in that theatre of war, but also adequate and prompt measures should be taken in order to secure the quickest possible supply of war materials to these fighting fronts. If this is not

done

done with sufficient expediency the situation may arise that the fighting forces in Malacca, the Philippines and Netherlands Indies have exhausted the available supplies and that fully trained personnel is doomed to inactivity because they have no weapons to fight with.

Japan, on the contrary, is at least for the present in a position to ship the necessary war materials and other supplies to its fighting forces in these regions.

It is therefore of the greatest importance that, apart from the dispatch of American naval and air forces, the supply of war materials to the areas in question should be intensified and accelerated to the utmost.

The Netherlands Indies Government is doing its utmost in order to maintain ship connections with the United States of America and to continue the delivery of strategic materials to this country. With a view thereto it is essential to be informed of the system of American protection of merchant vessels on the

Pacific-

Wal Del is making sop P.I. - . C. A. F.E. has did to us PI . also . (mar. av. also, aux).

Pacific-routes as only thus Netherlands Indies authorities will be in a position to consistently derout ship traffic.

The Netherlands Indies Government will give subsequent information as to the military and civil requirements which are most needed.

Washington, 16 December 1941.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON

December 17, 1941

MEMORANDUM

FOR: THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

The attached memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy from the President of the United States requests information as to what should be done about the problem covered in the enclosed memorandum received by the President from the Netherlands Minister.

Lieutenant Commander, USNR Special Assistant to the Secretary

attachment

ed

(Sc) A16-1/EF48-1

Serial 0149212





December 20, 1941.

Momorandum for the President:

The attached memorandum of the Metherlands Minister, herewith returned, makes the following points:

The Governor General of the Hetherlands East Indies has received no information from American Headquarters.

He stresses the importance of the supply of war materials to the Far Tast, and of a carefully coordinated defense.

He requests information as to the system used by the U.S. Havy in the protection of trans-Pacific Hetherlands shipping.

Late in November the Navy Department was informed that the Governor General of the Netherlands Host Indies had represented to the Minister here that he was not receiving information. Admiral Hart was directed on December 2nd to send pertinent information to the Butch Haval Cormander in Chicf; the Chief of Haval Operations stated that he considered this important, and suggested that our naval observer An Batavia undertake the liaison. The Chief of Baval Operations also suggested the Dutch send a limison officer to Admiral Hart in Hanila. Admiral Hart replied that a Dutch lisison officer had been in Manila for some time, and that he was constantly exchanging information with the Intch naval Commander in Chief. Inquiry at the lar Department establishes the fact that a military observer is stationed in Batavia. The Far Department believes that all pertinent information that the Commanding Conoral, Army Porces in the Far Mast, desires to convey has been transmitted to the Covernor General.

The subject of coordinated defense was long ago a subject of conversations at Singapore, at which the lutch were represented. A conference with a similar purpose is now being held, or soon will be held, in Singapore.

E.O. 11652, Esc. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CSD latter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NAME D. APR 6 1973

249'201

Address these efficers are fully informed as to Admiral tert's plans, and it is certain that they have conveyed pertunent information to the letherlands test Indies authorities, and will make joint plans with them. Idmiral classford commands the U.S. Havy surface vessels of the laistic Plant, and one patrol becker squadren. This force new comprises 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 2 guntests, several minesweepers, and 5 strengt, destroyer, and submarine tenders. His curface vessels lack fighter sireraft defence, and can not operate in area where desirated by anexy air strength. They are now in the Hetherlands that Indies, operating symbol the probability of penetration of this area by Japanese naval forces.

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The Metherlands Mavel Attache in "ashington has been informed that the United States naval authorities would be glad to furnish "routings" to Dutch vessels departing U.S. ports. The suggestion was also made that the Metherlands Mavel Attache request routings from the Oritich Mavel Control Service Organization in other than United States ports.

[337221 [77]

PRANK KNOX. E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(D) and 5(D) or (E)

CSD letter, No. 3, 1973

L. RE. HURLAPR 6 073

a49,02

(SC) 716-1/EF 18-1

Serial 0149212





December 20, 1941.

Momorandum for the President:

The attached memorandum of the Netherlands Minister, herewith returned, makes the following points:

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He requests information as to the system used by the U.S. Havy in the protection of trans-Pacific Netherlands shipping.

Late in November the Navy Department was informed that the Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies had represented to the Minister here that he was not receiving information. Admiral Hart was directed on December 2nd to send pertinent information to the Dutch Maval Commander in Chief; the Chief of Haval Operations stated that he considered this important, and suggested that our naval observer an Batavia undertake the liaison. The Chief of Maval Operations also suggested the Dutch send a ligison officer to Admiral Hart in Manila. Admiral Hart replied that a Dutch lisison officer had been in Manila for some time, and that he was constantly exchanging information with the Dutch naval Commander in Chief. Inquiry at the War Department establishes the fact that a military observer is stationed in Batavia. The War Department believes that all pertinent information that the Commanding Coneral, Army Forces in the Far East, desires to convey has been transmitted to the Covernor General.

The subject of coordinated defense was long ago a subject of conversations at Singapore, at which the Dutch were represented. A conference with a similar purpose is now being held, or soon will be held, in Singapore.

E.O. 11682, Sec. 2(2) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD Later, May 3, 1972

L. M.C. Mars Date PR 6 1973

049001

Oldonia To orangen for the President

Details. These officers are fully informed as to Admiral Mart's plans, and it is certain that they have conveyed pertinent information to the Tatherlands lest Indies outheristies, and will make joint plans with them. Admiral Massford covereds the U.S.Lavy surface vessels of the Asistic Floot, and one petrol bester squaires. His force now comprises E or loves, 8 destroyers, 8 purboats, several minesuropers, and S strength, estroyer, and subswrine tengers. His surface vessels lack fighter singustine tengers, and can not operate in areas there dominated by energy air strength. They are now in the letterlands and Indies, operating symbol the probability of penetration of this area by Japanese navel forces.

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to the Netherlands Hest Indies is by the choice of routes that at the time appear safest. There are not crouth nen-of-war to escent all vessels on the route scrass the Pacific, though troop conveys must be excepted. In alternative is the route around the Caps of Good Hope.

The Hetherlands Havel Altecha in Eachington has been informed that the United States naval authorities would be riad to furnish "routings" to Butch vessels departing U.S. port. The suggestion was also made that the Hetherlands Havel Attache request routings from the Initiah Havel Control Service Organization in other than United States ports.

DEC 100 200

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

PRANK KNOX.

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NAMES Dat APR 6 1973 -2-

a49002

Ps. 5.21.

frot

Neterica

The Netherlands Government says that
the United States Government are awaiting assent
of His Majesty's Government to Dutch association
with the combined Chiefs of Staff Committee for
discussion of matters relating to the South West
Pacific. Please at once inform the United
States Government that we welcome such
participation by the Dutch.

February 17th 1942.

ROYAL NETHERLANDS LEGATION . WASHINGTON

CA-437

./.

Chelenter

February 23rd, 1942.

Dear Mr. Fopkins,

In accordance with the President's wish,
I have the honor to transmit to you herewith
a personal message of Her Pajesty, the queen
of the Hetherlands to the President of the
United States of America.

Believe me, Sear ir. Hopkins

Yours sincerely,

Fr. Harry Hopkins The white House "askington, J. C. The serious development of events around Java and the imminent menace to our lust military strong-hold, which is a most valuable base for an offensive against Japan, induces me to make a most urgent appeal to you, my dear bresident, as an associate and great friend of my country.

That island where about 50 million people live, my peoples and I are determined to defend to the last.

I am fully convinced you will give all possible help, but I must emphasize that in this moment immediate assistance is the only real one.

I have been greatly hoartened by the recent successful cooperation of our forces and I thereby feel all the more convinced that, if such action could be repeated, the whole situation might be changed.

Milhelmina

BY BOYATY Archart of the U.S. ... FEBRUAR

Safe - The

February 26, 1942.

CHORDS AND PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR BIDDLE, LONDON.

FOR H. M. THE QUEEN OF THE NETHERLANDS

I have received your personal message and I want to assure you that we are doing everything possible to get more fighter planes into Java. Some are on their way there directly at the present time. The problem is going to be to get fighter planes from Australia to Java in view of the apparent loss of Timor. My people in Australia have definite orders to keep sending all possible reinforcements of every and any kind that will be useful. I think the American Navy ships are operating usefully under your Admiral.

I received word from Aruba that our planes got there just in time. The coast guns had arrived two or three days before the bombardment but had not yet been set up. Apparently the planes prevented destruction of the refinery.

In the East Indies your forces are putting up a gallant fight and none of us here subscribe to the thought that they will inevitably be defeated. There are signs that the Japanese are much disturbed by their exceedingly heavy losses.

I send you my very warm regards.

ROOSEVELT

a49-01

Kront

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BIDDLE:

FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM QUEEN WILHELMINA IS CON-VEYED TO YOU AT HER REQUEST;

"I AM LOOKING FORWARD VERY MUCH TO MY VISIT TO YOU AND MRS ROOSEVELT AND WILL BE HAPPY TO MEET .

YOUR COUNTRYMEN AND SEE YOUR BEAUTIFUL COUNTRY SO SOON. I GREATLY THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE. WILHELMINA."

IN A DAY OR TWO PRINCE BERNHARD WILL GIVE ME DETAILS OF ACCOMPANYING PERSONS AND PLANS IN THE UNITED STATES. HE TELLS ME THAT THE QUEEN WILL PLAN TO DEPART ON ELEVEN JUNE.

NCR 3886

) timb 11/

BIDDLE

LONDON

VIA STATE DEPARTMENT (CODE) JUNE 11, 1942

ALL ARRANGEMENTS TO CANADIAN GOVERNMENT MADE. PLEASE WIRE CAMADIAN PREMIER PLACE AND HOUR OF ARRIVAL AND NOTIFY ME ALSO. I PERSONALLY FEAR I CANNOT GO TO MYDE PARK UNTIL TWENTYEIGHTH BUT EXPECT TO SEE THE GUEST Think.

ROOSEVELT

HONORABLE W. MACKENZIE KING

VIA STATE DEPARTMENT (CODE) JUNE 11, 1942

THANK YOU FOR HANDLING THE MATTER I TELEPHONED
YOU ADJUT. PLEASE THANK THE GOVERNOR GENERAL ALSO.
HAVE ASKED BIDDLE INFORM YOU HOUR AND PLACE ARRIVAL.
I THINK OUR GUEST SHOULD STAY AT OTTAWA UNTIL ABOUT
THE TWENTIETH BEFORE PROCEEDING TO HOUSE AT STOCKBRIDGE
MASSACHUSETTS, THUS GIVING TIME TO HAVE HOUSE IN PROPER
ORDER. I CANNOT GO TO HYDE PARK UNTIL ABOUT JUNE TWENTYEIGHTH
BUT WILL SEE OUR GUEST AT ABOUT THAT TIME. PLEASE TELL
HER DAUGHTER OF THE ABOVE.

ROOSEVELT


FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BIDDLE 11 JUNE 1942

- (1) QUEEN WILHELMINA ASKS ME TO TRANSMIT TO MOU THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE: "I THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE AND VERY KIND THOUGHT SUGGESTING SHORTENING MY JOURNEY BY FIRST LANDING AT OTTAWA AND I SHOULD BE VERY HAPPY IF THAT COULD BE SO ARRANGED. I SHALL BE DELIGHTED TO COME AND STAY WITH YOU AND MRS. ROOSEVELT AT HYDE PARK AS YOU SO KINDLY PROPOSE AS SOON AS I AM SETTLED IN THE HOUSE WHICH YOU SO KINDLY INFORM ME WILL BE AT MY DISPOSAL FROM THE 15TH AND WHICH I AM SURE WILL BE MOST BECOMING WILHELMINA."
- (2) IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUEEN'S VISIT TO HYDE PARK, I KNOW SHE WOULD APPRECIATE MOUR GIVING HER A HINT LATER AS TO JUST WHEN YOU AND MRS. ROOSEVELT WOULD LIKE HER TO COME.
- (3) IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR THOUGHTFUL OFFER TO INFORM THE CANADIAN GOVERNOR GENERAL AND PREMIER OF THE QUEEN'S APPROACHING ARRIVAL IN CANADA, SHE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD SAY TO THEM THAT SHE WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENTS REGARDING YOUR COMMUNI-CATION IN THE MATTER AS ALSO BEING IN BEHALF OF THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT, WHICH FOR REASONS OF SECURITY, BELIEVES IT BETTER

NOT TO MAKE AN INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATION WHICH WOULD OTHER-WISE BE THENORMAL PROCEDURE.

- (4) PRINCE BERNHARD BEGS LEAVE TO SUGGEST THAT WHEN COMMUNICATING WITH CANADIAN GOVERNOR GENERAL AND PREMIER, A REFERENCE MAY BE MADE TO THE NEED FOR THE CANADIAN AUTHORITIES PROVIDING THE NECESSARY POLICE PROTECTION WHILE IN CANADA.
- (5) ARRANGEMENTS FOR PLANE ARE BEING WORKED OUT SATISFACTORILY AND THE QUEEN TENTATIVELY PLANS TO TAKE OFF TOMORROW OR THE DAY AFTER. I SHALL LET YOU KNOW DEFINITE DAY OF DEPARTURE AND PROPOSED CANADIAN POINT OF ARRIVAL AS SOON AS PAN AMERICAN HAS WORKED THIS OUT, SO THAT YOU CAN CONFIRM TO PROPER CANADIAN AUTHORITIES.
- (6) SINCE THE DUTCH CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT THE MONARCH SHALL NOT GO ABROAD WITHOUT A MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER VAN KLEFFENS, ACCOMPANIED BY AN ASSISTANT, BARON C. W.VAN HAERSOLTE, WILL GO TO THE UNITED STATES IN FULFILL-MENT OF THAT REQUIREMENT. THEY WILLHOWEVER NOT TRAVEL IN THE QUEEN'S PLANE.
- (7) IN THE PARTY ACCOMPANYING THE QUEEN, ZINAIDE SOZPENKOFF HAS BEEN SUBSTITUTED FOR MARIA GROENHUIJZEN AS THE QUEEN'S MAID.

NCR 3458





Joseph Johnson

CEORET

9 JUNE 1942

FOR PRESIDENT F. D. ROOSEVELT.

FROM BIDDLE

JONKHEER VAN TETS VAN GUDRIAAN, CHIEF OF CIVIL HOUSEHOLD OF QUEEN WILHELMINA; LIEUTENANT CHRISTOFFEL KREDIET AND FIRST LIEUTENANT DIRK TER BEEK, AIDES; AND MARIA GROENHUIJZEN, MAID, WILL ACCOMPANY QUEEN WILHELMINA.

State

By J. Schauble Date____

NCR2292

O E O R E T

OEORET

Office of the Chief of Mayal Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence

In reply refer to No.
Op-16

WASHINGTON

24 April 1940

Dear Dan:

The word that a memorandum for the President as to our estimate of the present situation did not reach John Magruder and me until after working hours yesterday, so to catch this morning's air mail pouch, departing at ten, John is preparing his memorandum, Bode is preparing ours, and I am writing this general comment on the Norwegian situation.

To me there seems no indication of an early decision being arrived at, and whether or not the Allies will ever succeed in driving the Germans out of the Oslo region is highly problematical. The Germans, as is well known, made a surprise and simultaneous invasion of the principal Morwegian ports in a manner doing credit to their military efficiency. There are indications, however, that their losses of transports incident to this operation were so great that their landing forces were none too adequate. It is significant that they have not been able to push out more than about fifty miles from Oslo, nor that far from any other port, that they have not been able to link up between any two ports. and that they have not been able to take the fortress of Hegre, east of Trondheim. The difficult terrain, scarce and sloppy flying fields, and interrupted communications (destroyed railroad bridges, etc.), are obstacles that will slow down both sides, but, in my opinion, favor the last comer.

The Allies landed with commendable despatch, and have promptly effected contact with the Norwegians, including the area just north of Oslo, which I consider creditable.

I believe the effect on neutrals made by the sudden and secret German invasion of Norway must, to a considerable extent, be cancelled by the prompt allied counter-action. Especially should that be so when one compares the price already paid to accomplish the situation in Norway as it now is.

The German reports of naval and air activity in connection with these operations has reached a new high in mendacity for this war we definitely know. In spite of all the extravagant German statements it was authoritatively stated as of the 20th that the British losses were one submarine and four destroyers, and this is confirmed as of the 23rd by Lord Hankey speaking in the House of Lords. Of course, in addition there have been vessels damaged, viz, one cruiser, two destroyers (able to return to their bases) and the battleships RENOWN and RODNEY hit "but not seriously damaged", four other destroyers damaged, also three cruisers by bomb splinters. As you know, the Germans admit the loss of the BLUECHER (10,000 tons) KARLSRUHE (6,000 tons) and various destroyers whether admitted or not numbering about ten; also, there are probably German losses of one or two other 6,000 ton cruisers, one and probably more submarines, eleven or more transports and naval auxiliaries with considerable additions of German merchant type vessels which may or may not have been transports or supply ships. I believe you are familiar with the case of the British cruiser SUFFCLK subjected to thirty-three dive bombing attacks, eighty-two bombs dropped, hit once, returned to Scapa under her own power, but we now know, then had to be beached.

The British made an authorized statement as of the 20th, and it appears to be repeated in London dispatch of the 23rd, that up to date the British had lost no transports nor a single life in connection with their landing operations. From this brief survey two things are evident, viz, the Germans have paid much the greater price so far, and their statements as to enemy losses must be heavily discounted.

I can tell you definitely from Alan Kirk's reports that the British naval staff are delighted that the Germans have gone into Norway in this way as the British are confident they can bottle up and destroy any German ships in Norwegan ports which, incidentally, they have made good progress in demonstrating when we consider Narvik. There is a report that a Duetchland (10,000 tons) is aground in one of the Norway fjords.

While it is probably true that the air preponderance in Norway lies with the Germans, that does not appear to be a decisive factor. Also, the British air raids of Stavangar, Aalborg airport in northern Denmark, and even the Oslo air bases show the British offensive still capable of acting.

The submarine warfare, in general, has taken a tremendous drop. Allied and neutral merchant ship losees in March dropped to a daily average of about 4500 tons. The previous daily average for the war was around 7000 tons, which was about one-third of the World War rate. The indications are that the rate of loss in April will be only about half that of March. The query suggests itself, are the Germans using their submarines for transports to Norway.

It is hard to see what good the Germans can get out of occupying various Norwegian ports, when they can have no surface entrance or exit from any of them except perhaps Oslo. and that undoubtedly seriously impeded by British submarines.

Looking at the whole Norwegian situation objectively and without assuming either that there will be an early decision or that the Germans can be entirely run out of the country. I still believe the Allies have reason to feel that the Norwegian occupation will favor them more than the Germans. The Germans have paid the greater initial price. The present situation, while none too clearly defined, certainly does not impressively favor them. It casts considerable doubt as to the long term issue. I believe Mussolini can see that and will continue noncommittal. My own surmise is that the long term issue will favor the Allies.

If you will let me know when additional memoranda from John Magruder and me are desired by the President, we will see that they are provided.

Please present my respects and best wishes to the President. I hope he and you all are enjoying your change in the South.

With every good wish,

Faithfully yours,

W. S. Anderson,

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.

Captain Dan Callaghan, U.S.N.,

Aide to the President,

Warm Springs, Georgia.

Estimate about 40000

luderica,

In reply refer to No.

Op=16-F

WASHINGTON

24 April 1940

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Scandinavian Operations - Resume of.

- From the incomplete and conflicting reports of the Seandinavian operations - Allied, German and Norwegian - the following resume is deduced as the closest practical approximation to the factual.
- On 8-9 April, the Germans completed the military occupation of Denmark without resistance.
- cupation of all important bases in Norway Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger, Kristiansand, and Oslo. The first direct evidence that this movement was in progress was furnished by the sinking of the German merchant steamer "Rio de Janeiro" by a British submarine four miles south of Kristiansand. This vessel had about 300 German troops aboard in full field uniform, 150 of whom were rescued and so identified by Norwegian fishermen. Reports indicate entry was effected by:

 (a) gradual infiltration of men and material from merchant vessels to ports on the west coast of Norway; (b) infiltration by the ordinary means of travel by train and ferry into southern Norway; (c) transport by air. Heavy field guns (155 mms.) were reported to have been landed at Narvik, Bergen, and Trondheim from merchant vessels.

4. On 9 April -

- (a) Germans made an air attack on Scapa Flow lasting about 75 minutes, resulting in no damage to ships at the base. One German plane was shot down by pursuit planes.
- (b) The RODNEY was struck by a 1000-pound bomb. Three officers and seven men were wounded. Material damage was negligible. This action took place about 60 miles west of Bergen.
- (c) The GLASGOW and SOUTHAMPTON were bombed no direct hits. Both vessels were struck by splinters. Total casualties, one killed, four wounded.
- (d) The AURORA was attacked five times by planes, but not hit. The accompanying destroyer GURKHA was struck by a bomb and sunk.

SUBJECT: Scandinavian Operations - Resume of (Continued)

- (e) The RENOWN engaged the SCHARNHORST off Narvik. Reported that SCHARNHORST was hit, but escaped in mist and smoke screen laid by the cruiser HIPPER.
- 5. On 10 April, an air attack was made on Scapa Flow; 50-60 planes participated. There were several capital ships, cruisers, and other light forces at the base at the time. There was no damage to the ships and no casualties aboard. Some damage ashore and some civilian casualties. No fewer than 6 German planes were brought down.
- 6. On April 12, the British were reported to have undertaken landing operations with preparatory attacks from the sea and by air at various points on the west coast. Attacks on Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen and Stavenger have been reported.

On 16 April, the British occupied the Farce Islands.

On 18 April, the British made a determined air and naval attack on Stavanger to destroy the important air field located there.

- 7. An analysis of the various reports of operations in Norway leads to the conclusion that Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger, and Kristiansand remain in German hands, but that British and perhaps some French units have effected landings in force at Andelsnes, about 100 miles south of Trondheim, and at Namsos, about 100 miles north of Trondheim. From these two points columns are converging toward the area to the eastward of Trondheim.
- 8. The main effort of the Germans is being made to the north-eastward of Oslo, in which area they are estimated to have 30,000 to 40,000 troops. The German advance from Oslo has been impeded by the Norwegian Army, which is reported now to be well organized, with competent staff work, in this area. The Norwegians plan delayed action tactics with retirement toward the coast instead of toward Sweden. The reports of land engagements in the Oslo area have been too contradictory and confusing for satisfactory analysis, although it is evident that Norwegian operations have appreciably slowed the German advance. The most recent reports indicate two major engagements one north of Trondheim; the other, north of Oslo.
- 9. The British minefields planted in the Baltic and in the Skaggerack are apparently not sufficiently dense to interfere seriously with the movement of German vessels. The minefields in the Skaggerack can not be defended against German sweeping operations. According to

SUBJECT: Scandinavian Operations - Resume of (Continued) -

German, Swedish, and Norwegian reports, German surface communication from the Danish and German Baltic ports is not seriously interrupted.

- 10. According to the latest reports received, the Germans have occupied Bornholm Island (off the south coast of Sweden) with 3,000 troops, and heavy troop and transport concentrations are being made at Stettin.
- 11. Conflicting reports indicate various major and minor actions at sea in connection with the general Norwegian operations. British sources announce the destruction of German supply ships and transports to the approximate number of 18. The Germans admit officially the loss of some of these ships, but have withheld information of the exact number. The British Admiralty, on the other hand, definitely announced (20 April) that no British ships had been lost except those officially listed. Naval losses or damage as deduced from information available are shown on the accompanying table.

W. Anderson.

W. S. Anderson.

SUMMARY OF NAVAL LOSSES NORWEGIAN OPERATIONS

Officially Admitted

British			German		
Lost		Damaged	Lost	Damaged	
Battleships:		1			
Battle Cruisers:		1			
Heavy Cruisers:		1	1		
Light Cruisers:		2	1		
Destroyers	3	7	2		
Submarines	1				

Probable Losses or Damage (not included above)

British**			Gern	ian
•	Lost	Damaged	Lost	Damaged
Battleship Battle Cru				2
Heavy Crus Light Crus Destroyers Submarines	isers; s:		1 6 1	3

**

British Admiralty announced no losses or damage except those officially admitted.

SAFE FILE: Norway

Safe: norway

WASHINGTON

For Bildke -Plane Til phone The fallawing in ringer of Norway for the Passistant & note ·

Reso Gryser but no news about Cyster.

Unguata

Office of Naval Intelligence 23 19 April 1940

NAVAL LOSSES DURING MORTEGIAN OPERATIONS (Corrected to D April - Third Revision)

BRITISH NAVAL LOSSES

Name	Tons	Dato Sunk	Date Damaged	Cause - Remarks
Battleship				
RODNEY*	33,950		4/9/40	1,000 lb. bomb - negli- gible damage - 4 officer and 7 men wounded - about 60 mi. SW of Bergenfjord.

9		
32,000	4/9/40	Gunfire of SCHARNHORST- unexploded shell com- pletely through at waterline - another damaged foremast - N. of Narvik.
	32,000	32,000 4/9/40

Heavy Cruisors

(Unconfirmed German claims of sinking	g YCRK and 1 CA of SUFFCLK Class by	•
Suffolk 10.000	4/17/40 I bomb hit off Stavanger. 27 34 wounded.	killed, Reached
Light Cruisers		5

Light Cruisers		< 35	
GLASGOW # (') 9,100	4/9/40	Slight splinter damage from acrial bombs - 1 killed, 4 wounded	
SOUTHAMPTON #(,)9,100	4/9/40	Slight splinter damago from aerial bombs	
1 (Glasgow type) Prior 4/19	1/17/40	Bomb off Stavanger - reached base Unconfirmed German claims sunk North	

Note: (1) Officially admitted as "Two craisers,

EEON DED UNCLACOMIDA)

Office of Maval Intelligence 23 19 April 1940

NAVAL LOSSES DURING NORTEGIAN OPERATIONS (Corrected to ** April - Third Revision)

(British Naval Losses - Cont.)

Trawler Rutlandshire*	450	4/21/40		Air attack - Namsos
THISTLE*	1,095	Ropartod 4/16/40		Missing - 53 officers and mon believed lost.
Submarines	SE TRUMPLE			
Eclipse *	1,375		prior 4/19	Bomb splinters near miss ".
3 *	(3)		4/13/40	Slightly damagod, Narvik
HOTSPUR*	1,340		4/10/40	Scriously damaged, gunfire at Narvik
HOSTILE*	1,340		4/10/40	Slightly damaged, Narvik
HARDY*	1,505	1920	4/10/40	Beached - several dam- aged by gunfiro, Narvik. 2 off. 4 men killed, 3 off. 6 men wounded.
HUNTER*	1,340	4/10/40		Gunfire, German DD's and shore guns, Narvik.
GURKHA *	1,870	4/9/40		Bombed & sunk - 5 off. and 10 men lost - about 60 mi. S7 Bergenfjord.
GLOWWORM*	1,345	4/8/40		Enemy gunfire off Nor- wegian coast
Destroyers				
Name	Tons	Date Sunk	Date Damaged	Cause - Remarks
	-			

Above list believed correct from information received to this date, but probably incomplete.

Notes: (*) Officially admitted by British Admiralty (#) Bolieved reliable

(a) Doubtful reliability.

UNCLASSINA

Office of Maval Intelligence 23 19 April 1940

NAVAL LOSSES DURING NORTEGIAN OPERATIONS (Corrected to ** April - Third Revision)

(British Naval Losses - Cont.)

Trawler Rutlandshire*	450	4/21/40		Air attack - Namsos
THISTLE*	1,095	Ropartod 4/16/40		Missing - 53 officers and mon believed lost.
Submarines	SE TRUMPLE			
Eclipse *	1,375		prior 4/19	Bomb splinters near miss ".
3 *	(3)		4/13/40	Slightly damagod, Narvik
HOTSPUR*	1,340		4/10/40	Scriously damaged, gunfire at Narvik
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Destroyers				
Name	Tons	Date Sunk	Date Damaged	Cause - Remarks
	-			

Above list believed correct from information received to this date, but probably incomplete.

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(a) Doubtful reliability.

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RESTRICTED

Office of Naval Intelligence 2319 April 1940

NAVAL LOSSES DURING NORWEGIAN OPERATIONS (Corrected to 19 April - Third Revision)

(German Noval Losses - Cont.)

Namo	Ton:	Date Sunk	Date Damaged	Cause - Remarks
Destroyers (Cont)				
1 *	1,600	4/10/40		Torpedo - Narvik
3 (2?)#	1,600		4/10/40	Reported severely damaged by gunfire and burning - Narvik
1#	(?)	4/11/40		Claimed sunk, torpedo- planes - Trondheim .
6 1 #	1,811 or 1,600	4/13/40		Sunk by gunfire, Marvik. Apparently includes those proviously reported domaged at Marvik - possibly Desdivs 2 & 4.
Submarines				
1 (?) #	(?)	4/10/40(?)		Claimed by ZULU off Orkneys.
(?) @	(?)	(?)		2 or 3 others reported sunk
1 @	(?)	2	4/16/40	Bomb.
		*		
Transports , Merchant Vessels, Store Ships				
RIO DE JANEIRO #	5,261	4/8/40)	Torpedoed - Polish SS "orzel"
KRETA #	2,359	4/8/40)	by British
POSEIDON #	3,911	4/8/40)	submarine.
RAVERFELS # (Ammunition)	3	4/10/40	34	Sunk - British DD's at Narvik.
ALSTER #	8,145	*		Captured - 4/10/40 off Vestfjord.
		20		

RESTRICTED

Office of Naval Intelligence

NAVAL LOSSES DURING NORWEGIAN OPERATIONS

(Corrected to 19 April - Third Revision)

(German Naval Losses - Cont.)

Name	Tons	Date Sunk	Date Damaged	Cause - Remarks
Transports, etc.				
AMASIS #		4/9/40		British SS off Oslo.
SKACERRAK #	6,004	(?)		Scuttled
MAINE #	7,624	(?)		Scuttled
IONIA #	3,102	(?)		Reported sunk
ANTEAS #	2,593	(?)		Reported sunk
A. LEONHARDT #	2,593	(3)		Torpedoed-HMS-Scalion
MOONSUND #	321	(?)		Reported sunk

Trawlers

FRIESLIND #

NORDLIND #

BLANKENBURG #

Captured, Norse coast 4/11/40

Captured, date unknown

Captured, date unknown

(British claim grand total of 27 transports or supply ships sunk)

Above list believed reasonably correct from information received to this date, but probably incomplete.

Notes: (*) Officially admitted by German Admiralty

(#) Believed reliable.

(O) Doubtful reliability.

Uki, Landon

-5-

AT TO LETTED

Office of Naval Intelligence 2319 April 1940

NAVAL LOSSES DURING NORWEGIAN OPERATIONS

(Corrected to 10 April - Third Revision)

NORWEGIAN NAVAL LOSSES

Namo	Tons	Dato Sunk	Dato Damaged	Causo - Romarks
Coast Dofonso		80		
NORGE #	4,166	4/9/40) Torp	cdood by Gorman
EIDSVOLD #	4,166	4/9/40) dost) Narv	royers at ik.

Torpedo Boats

EVAL O

Captured at Oslo.

Gunboat

SENUA (?)@

243

4/12/40

Sot afire by British guns after capture by Germans at Narvik (unconfirmed report)


Licase list believed reasonably correct from information received to this date, but probably incomplete.

Note: (*) Officially admitted by Norvegian Admiralty

(f) Bolioved reliable

(3) Poubtful roliability.

-6-



TWO MAIN FRONTS DEVELOP IN NORWAY

Important battles apparently are under way around Trondheim and north of Oslo. Above Trondheim the Germans said they had routed an Allied force near Namos (1) and landed reinforcements at Indercey, while the British asserted they had resisted a German attack there. Below Trondheim, according to Berlin, Andalsnes (2) was heavily bombed and off the coast warships and transports were hit. Berlin also contended the railway junction at Dombaas (3) had been destroyed.

In the rectangle formed by Lillehammer, Rena, Elverum and Hamar (4) a crucial struggle was going on. The British and Norwegians, moving down east of Lake Mjoesen, were said to have reached Moely, while the Germans, moving up west of the lake, may have taken Lillehammer. Either side, depending on the strength of the foe, may be cut off in this region.

Airfields at Oslo (5) were bombed by Allied planes, as was the Nazi air base at Aalborg (7). In the Skagerrak (6) a naval battle was reported.

F Lake: Norway

Work rail)

CK
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

London

Dated June 12, 1940 Rec'd 6:05 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

2.4

1615, June 12, 6 p.m.

The Norwegian Minister has just called to see me at the request of the King and the Crown Prince who say that due to the speed necessary for the movement of the British troops and the King out of Norway it was impossible to take time to get the Crown Princess and the three children who are at present in Stockholm. The Crown Prince said that the President was kind enough to write some months ago offering to be of what service he could to the Crown Prince and Princess if occasion arose. King and the Crown Prince are naturally afraid that the Germans will somehow or other get the Crown Princess and the little Prince and are wondering if it would be possible for them to be taken out on an American ship from Gothenburg or some other port. The other alternative would be of course to go overland to Vladivostok and sail from there; but in that event they are uncertain what the Russians might do to them. The Norwegian

PERSONAL AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT

Minister

-2-#1615, June 12, 6 p.m. from London.

Minister quite appreciates what a terrific problem this i... but it is naturally of great concern he says to both the King and the Crown Prince, and he asks if the President has any suggestions that he could make which would help them.

KENNEDY

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SDI OPAL FROM SECSTATE.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM AMERICAN LEGATION OSLO NOVEMBER 4.

RUSH 92 NOVEMBER 4 9 AM

THE LEGATIONS 9THOVEMBER 4 7 AM

THE NORWEGIAN BATTLESHIP OLAY TRYGGVASON IS JUST ARRIVING IN BERGEN FROM HAUGESUND WITH GERMAN PRIZE CREW ON BOARD TO BE INTERNED. CITY OF FLINT WILL ARRIVE AT BERGEN ABOUT 10 AM FLYING AMERICAN FLAG. AMERICAN CREW WILL BE HELD ON BOARD TO AWAIT INSTRUCTIONS FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE. CONSUL DUNLAP THE PHONES HEARTY COOPERATION OF NORWEGIAN OFFICIALS ASSURED. MEMBER OF AMERICAN CREW REPORTED ILL HAS NOTHING SERIOUS. MORNING PRESS CARRIES STORY OF SHIPS RELEASE. PRESS REPRESENTATIVES EAGER FOR FURTHER NEWS. I HAVE SUGGESTED TO CONSUL AT BERGEN NOT TO GIVE INFORMATION TO THE PRESS AND TO ADVISE CAPTAIN OF THE CITY OF FLINT LIKEWISE PENDING YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. (SIGNED) HARRIAXXXX HARRIMAN.

PSF Safe: Norway


UNCLASSIFIEM

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM AMERICAN LEGATION OSLO NOV 4.

93 NOVEMBER 4 10AM.

I AM PLANNING TO ARRIVE BERGEN MONDAY MORNING (THERE
IS NO TRAIN TODAY) TO GET FIRST HAND INFORMATION REGARDING WELFARE
OF CITY OF FLINT CREW. (SIGNED) HARRIMAN.
TOD 830AM NOV 4 WJ.

-



ofe: in my

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

CONTIDENTIAL

September 18, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The substance of recent reports received from Commander Task Group 6.5 (Northeast Greenland Patrol, NORTHLAND, NORTH STAR, BEAR), is of possible interest to the President.

The sixty ton Norwegian steamer BUSKOE, chartered by Norwegian expedition headed by Hallvard DeVold, was boarded by U.S.C.G. cutter NORTHLAND at Myggbukta on 12 September. There was a crew of ten, with 11 passengers, all of whom were Norwegians and one of whom was a woman. Personnel carried the usual hunting guns and stated they left Norway 29 August and arrived Greenland on 4 September. Information elicited indicated that three men and radio transmitter had been left at Peter Bay, two men at Cape Maurer and one at Revet, with the remaining passengers to be landed at Myggbukta, Cape Humbolt and Havna. The BUSKOE was held pending further investigation and the NORTHLAND proceeded to Peter Bay to remove radio station before ice closed in. The Greenland Government was informed at this time. Apparently the Norwegian government in London had no knowledge of this expedition.

NORTHLAND arrived at Peter Bay station on 14 September and found German radio transmitter, meterological instruments, secret German code and three Norwegians, one of whom was a German agent whom the Gestapo arranged to have included as a member of the expedition. Agent prepared to send daily weather reports and other military information of value to German officials in Norway. NORTHLAND personnel removed all portable gear, including radio and meterological equipment and a special code which is now in custody of Commander Task Group 6.5. Some equipment was burned. NORTHLAND also evacuated personnel and material of other stations established by BUSKOE expedition, and plans to leave Arctic supplies at Greenland government stations at Eskimonaes and Ellas Island. A full report is to follow by first safe mail.

Navy Department, after consultation with the State Department, has asked for comment and recommendation from Commander Task Group 6.5 as to the feasibility of bringing ship, crew and passengers to a United States port, under protective custody.

Investigation indicates that this attempt, with German approval and financial support, to establish relatively large numbers of Norwegians in northeast Greenland was primarily for the purpose of reviving Norwegian claims to parts of Greenland, at next peace conference.

Respectfully,

J. R. BEARDALL

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Meanore

SAFE FILE: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES: MAR. 1944

Draft 10-5-43

SI PLAN FOR CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA



PSF: Saye: 0.55

A

General Outline

SI activities in China and Southeast Asia will be directed from two general headquarters, one at Chungking and the other at New Delhi.

1. Activities directed from Chungking will include:
Activities in South China

Main base will be at Chungking, and principal intermediate bases at Kunming and Kweilin.

Activities in Burma -- Thailand -- Indo-China -- Malaya

Main base will be at Kurming.

Activities in North China

Bases yet to be determined.

Activities in Manchuria and Korea

Bases yet to be determined.

2. Activities directed from New Delhi will include:

Activities in Burna--Thailand--Malaya


Base in Assam with Eifler. Close collaboration will be maintained with the corresponding activities based on Kunming. It may be that these activities will eventually be brought under the direction of the base at Kunming, but this decision will be deferred.

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By Authority of 007622

Cla Lts., 7/30/73/Donnally to Road)

By john Date 8/7/73



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Page 2

SI Plan for China and Southeast Asia

Activities in Sumatra

Main base will be at Colombo.

B

Initial Steps

The initial steps to be taken are:

- 1. To send Judge Allman with Drummond, Gleysteen and Sargent to Chungking, as economic and technical adviser on General Stilwell's Staff. Judge Allman will establish the Chungking General Headquarters and the Chungking base for South China activities and will promptly move to establish the intermediate bases at Kunming and Kweilin for South China activities. He will also exercise general supervision over the prompt establishment of the Kunming base for activities in Burma--Thailand--Indo-China--Malaya.
- 2. To send Mr. Scholz, together with Chartrand, Pittard, Major Glass and Capt. Wester to Eifler and to Kunming. Scholz will discuss possibilities with Eifler, and then proceed to Kunming to establish his base. He may leave Chartrand and possibly either Pittard or Wester with Eifler to begin the development of activities at that base. He will proceed to Kunming with the others, to establish his headquarters there in accordance with the general plan of Project FE No. 23. A small number of Thais who have been thoroughly trained in this country will be sent out either initially or very soon thereafter.

- 3. To send Lieut. Koke, with one American and five Indonesians, to Colombo, to report to Ripley there. Ripley will be instructed to establish headquarters at Colombo and to undertake activities in accordance with the general plan of Project FE No. 22.
- 4. To direct Hutcheson to establish general headquarters at New Delhi.

C

Timetable for Further Development

It is contemplated that the foregoing activities, once properly started, will expand rapidly, and will involve the employment, within six months to a year, of 180 officers, 570 enlisted men, a number of civilians and hundreds of natives. The precise rate and direction of development will be governed, of course, by the wishes of the Theater Commanders, the advice of our men on the ground, and the availability of transportation and military personnel.

NOTE

A detailed amplification of this outline is in preparation and will be ready by this
evening. It will include an integration of these
plans with the radio intelligence network for
the 10th and 14th Air Forces previously prepared
by Colonel Lowman at the request of General
Davidson.

The headquarters for S.I. activities in India may be shifted from New Delhi to Eifler's base at Assam.

We are planning to send ten men as geologists in connection with the oil field developments in Kansu, Sinkiang, and Shensi provinces. Six would be in the area adjacent to Lanchow where oil development is now being considerably expanded, two at Urumchi on the Russian border, and two in Shensi near Yenan, general headquarters of the Communist forces. These men are to be sent to China in conjunction with Air Transport Command project, to provide facilities for aviation gasoline, to meet transport and combat requirements.

PSF Safe

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a statement made by Abram Hewitt, whom I think you know. He was in Sweden for some time and these notes represent a meeting with Dr. Kersten, attending physician of Himmler, and the efforts of Kersten to induce Hewitt to go to Germany.

We have told Hewitt that he should not do
this as I assumed you would not care to have Americans
in Germany on such a basis.

William J. Donovan Director

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CONTACT WITH HIMMLER

I. Background

What follows can best be understood in the light of the general Swedish position and the organization of Swedish economy. While in a political sense the Swedes are freedom-loving people and consequently more than 90% pro-United Nations, there is in Sweden a very deep seated fear and distrust of Russia and the motives of the existing Russian government. The Swedes, therefore, being a small nation, are looking for a counter-weight to Russia after the war. They believe that the only effective counter-weight for them is Germany. On this account and due to the fact that a very big proportion of Swedish foreign trade is conducted with Germany and that there are very heavy Swedish investments in Germany, the Swedes are anxious that Germany should not be totally destroyed. In fact, the Swedes would like to see the war brought to an end with the least possible destruction of Germany.

Swedish economy is organized in three general blocks: (a) Government monopolies, including railroads, telephones, telegraphs, electric power, alcohol and

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tobacco; (b) Cooperatives covering a large percentage of consumers' goods, such as flour mills, groceries, etc.; and (c) Private banking, mining and manufacturing. This last field is largely dominated by organizations controlled by Enskilda Banken. This bank is controlled and managed by the Wallenberg family who have been bankers for a long time and whose foreign connections are the most important and extensive of any group in Sweden.

The present managing director of the bank is Jakob Wallenberg, who is a bachelor about 54 years old. He is responsible for the business of the bank dealing with the European continent, including Germany. His younger brother, Marcus Wallenberg, is responsible for the business of the bank dealing with the English-speaking world and South America.

Jakob Wallenberg is the permanent negotiator of the Swedish government with the German government in matters pertaining to trading agreements, barter, etc. In this position he has frequent contacts with the German government and visits Germany about four or five times a year. In his private capacity as a leading banker, he is in touch with a cross-section of the high ranking German

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financial and manufacturing interests.

I had known Jakob Wallenberg in 1932 when I was in Stockholm representing a trustee in bankruptcy of the International Match Corporation, the American holding company for the Ivar Kreuger interests. As a result of reorganization of the Kreuger interests, the Wallenberg's took over control of the Swedish Match Company and International Match Corporation, including their subsidiaries throughout the world. When I first saw Wallenberg in August 1943, he indicated that cells were forming in Germany for the purpose of overthrowing Hitler and he asked me if I would be willing to meet with representatives of these cells. I reported this fact at once to the American Minister in Stockholm, Mr. Herschel Johnson. He cabled the State Department at once, but no answer was received in Stockholm. At the end of this first interview with Wallenberg, he stated that his friends in Germany were somewhat perplexed about Himmler's true motives. While he was supposed to be entirely loyal to Hitler, certain changes were taking place in Germany which could only raise ques-

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tions in the minds of intelligent observers. Wallenberg's statement was made in vague terms of this sort. I took it to mean that there was some question as to Himmler's intention, eventually to oust Hitler and to take over the government himself.

Shortly after this conversation, Himmler was appointed Minister of the Interior, continuing to hold his other posts as Chief of the Gestapo and Chief of the SS. After about three months had gone by, I called Wallenberg's attention to the fact that nothing more had been heard of his proposal that I should meet with representatives of the cells organizing in Germany to overthrow Hitler. I asked if this meant that, following his appointment as Minister of the Interior, Himmler had succeeded in liquidating all of these cells, and that there was no longer in Germany any underground movement or group of cells worth talking about. Wallenberg confirmed that this was true, saying that, so far as he knew, there was no longer any organized resistance to the Nazis in Germany.

He gave it as his opinion that the only alterna-

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tives to Hitler in Germany were (a) the army, and (b)
Himmler. He stated that communications between high army
officers were under the control and supervision of Himmler's men; that whenever an army cell began to form which
was hostile to Hitler, Himmler let it form until he was
sure he knew who all the members were. These officers
were then relieved of their commands. This statement of
Himmler's relations with the army and his control of
communications between the officers was confirmed to me
by two other Swedes, who were very well informed about
existing conditions in Germany.

Wallenberg's statement that the only alternatives to Hitler were (a) the army, and (b) Himmler, was confirmed by every well informed Swede I knew who discussed the matter with me.

Wallenberg's statements were further confirmed by the fact that the Swedes, outside their official legation and consulate, had built their government connections in Germany largely around Himmler and his organization.

The Swedes coming out of Germany reported that nearly everyone in Germany thought that Germany could not

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win the war. However, they did not feel that their position was hopeless and would continue to fight. Their hopes were based on (1) a successful resistance to the Russians after shortening their line somewhere about the German border; (2) that they would be able to repulse the invasion launched from England; and (3) the devastating effects of their so-called "secret weapon" when used. The gossip in Germany was that this weapon would only be used when the invasion from England was launched.

Finally, all Swedes informed about Germany agreed in reporting that the doctrine of "unconditional surrender", announced by the United Nations, had resulted in uniting everyone in Germany behind Hitler at a time when the hardships of the war and the natural forces of disintegration would otherwise be disrupting Germany.

II. Dr. Kersten

In view of the foregoing, I was not surprised when about the beginning of October 1943 during a call at the office of a very close friend of mine, who was one of the key men in the Wallenberg organization, he handed me a card which read, "Dr. Felix Kersten, Medecinolrad". My

friend explained that this was the highest Finnish medical title, there being only three living men who hold it. He explained that while he himself was not acquainted with the doctor personally, he did know that he was one of the most powerful men in Germany. He went on to say that seven Swedish engineers employed by the Swedish Match Subsidiary in Poland had been caught and convicted of working with the Polish Underground. The Director of the Swedish Match Monopoly in Germany, Alva Moller, a mutual friend of ours, had gone to the doctor with a plea to have the death sentence of the Swedish engineers commuted, and this had been done. In addition, the doctor had arranged for two Dutch children, the son and daughter of the former Dutch Minister to Italy, to be given safe conduct through Germany to join their sister in Sweden. This had been done without delay, and I saw the children myself to verify this account. They did not, of course, know who had arranged for their passage but I did verify that they had been trying to get out of Switzerland for more than three years without success.

Since the doctor was renowned as a nerve specialist, an appointment was arranged for him to examine me on

the pretext that I had vertebrae in my back which were causing me pain. The meeting took place and I found that the doctor spoke Finnish, Russian, Dutch and German but no English. All conversations between us took place in German. The doctor agreed to give me a course of treatment which he said would extend for about six weeks. This he did, giving me a manual therapy treatment which was designed to get blood into the nerves. The treatment was very painful and lasted for about an hour each day except Sundays.

During the course of these treatments the doctor told me about his life, as follows:

He had been a very poor boy in Finland and had suffered considerable hardships in order to complete his medical education. The development of this manual therapy treatment through the nervous system was entirely his own work. His practice had grown until, in 1928, he was called into consultation by the Court in Holland to examine Henry, the Prince Consort. He gave the Prince a course of manual therapy which was so successful that he was retained to become the "Leibarzt" to the Prince. He settled in The

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Hague where he remained except for trips to Italy where he treated Mussolini, Ciano and other high Italian government officials, and also members and officials of the Rumanian court and government.

In 1938, he had treated Himmler with great success. The result was that, when the Germans overran Holland in 1940, the Gestapo notified him that they would not be responsible for the safety of his family or himself unless he moved to Berlin. This he did in 1941. He showed me a Gestapo paper requiring him to move. His purpose in showing this paper probably was to try to persuade me that his removal to Berlin was not voluntary.

He became "Leibarzt" to Himmler and was retained by the SS organization to treat 21 of their officials each year. This required him to spend a great deal of his time at SS Headquarters. His contract provided for a salary of 60,000 marks a year, and he was given six times the normal gasoline ration for doctors.

He explained his presence in Sweden by saying that Alva Moller had come to him and had offered him 100,000 Swedish kroner if he could succeed in persuading

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Himmler and Hitler to commute the sentence of death for the seven Swedish engineers. He reported that he had talked with Himmler several times and had interviewed Hitler two or three times as well on this matter. He stated that he had refused the offer of 100,000 kroner point blank.

When the death sentence was commuted, the Swedes, through Alva Moller, asked if there was not something they could do for him, and invited him to spend a two months' vacation in Sweden.

What I think happened was that he reported the offer of 100,000 korner to Himmler, who told him to refuse it, but arranged to get the engineers' death sentences commuted. Himmler knew that the Swedes would have to offer the doctor something else besides money, and that there was very little else they could do except invite him for a visit to Sweden. Undboutedly, it suited Himmler's purpose very well to have a representative in Stockholm who was not a German citizen, and a Finnish citizen would be much more able to establish contact with Americans.

During the course of six weeks' treatment, the

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doctor told me a good deal about Himmler. Himmler had started life as an agricultural student, and had remained throughout his life keenly interested in questions of race and heredity. He was fanatically anti-Russian, having a great fear of the consequences of the high Russian birth rate, and disliking the threatened mixture of Slav blood with German blood. On the other hand, he had a great liking for the Anglo-Saxons because of their similarity of blood and racial characteristics with the Germans. Himmler had stated repeatedly to the doctor what a pity it was that Germans had to fight Englishmen and Americans, who were phsycially so like the Germans.

Contrary to most members of the Gestapo, Himmler was completely honest. He lived on a salary of 36,000 marks a year, and had no interest in accumulating money. Furthermore, he was completely loyal to his wife, a woman some 10 years older than Himmler.

The doctor said that most of the ministers in the German government, such as Ley, were totally unimportant. Himmler's relations with Goebbels and Ribbentrop were very bad as there was acute jealousy on each side. I

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gathered that Goering was no longer very important as a vital force in Germany, and hence did not count a great deal in Himmler's calculations one way or another.

Martin Bormann, on the other hand, had been put in by Himmler in the party chancery under Hess, and after Hess' imprisonment in England, Bormann had taken his place. So far as the doctor know, Bormann was still a Himmler man. My Swedish friends had told me that the SS had been expanded enormously and they believed included 1,500,000 men as early as January 1943. The doctor reported that there were over 2,000,000 men in the SS in October 1943, and that about 600,000 more men were in the Gestapo, all under Himmler's control and command.

Himmler realized that Germany could not win the war. He was anxious to salvage as much as possible from the wreck and knew that the United Nations would not deal with Hitler on any conditions. I told the doctor that Himmler had a very bad press indeed, in both England and America, and that it was very doubtful whether the American or British governments would deal with Himmler on any terms.

The doctor urged me to come to Germany to discuss Himmler's position with him, and to see whether a settlement might not be possible. He indicated clearly that, on certain conditions, Himmler was prepared to overthrow Hitler, and that he was the only man who had power to do so in Germany. I told him that I did not represent the American government, and that I did not even know what the current policies of the American government were, and that on this account, it would be pointless for me to talk with Himmler. The doctor then suggested that I return to Washington, familiarize myself with the position of the American government and come back to Europe.

He mentioned to me that Himmler was organizing his owngovernment within the SS, and that his two chief advisors on foreign affairs were Ober Fuehrer Walter Schellenberg and Dr. Braun; that he would be glad to get one of these men to come to Stockholm to confirm what he had been saying to me. Within a couple of days, he told me that Schellenberg was in Stockholm and would like to see me.

I saw Colonel Schellenberg twice and he confirmed everything that Dr. Kersten had been telling me. He also pressed me to come to Germany to talk with Himm-I .told him that I was by no means certain that there would be any point in my coming even at a later date, and that I might have trouble getting out of Stockholm due to the very tight priority situation on the British planes. He at once offered to put me out through Lisbon, giving me safe conduct through Germany and France. He suggested that, when I come back to Europe, I come back to Lisbon, as the Gestapo organization was very good there and was, in his opinion, very poor in Stockholm. He gave me the names of 2 of his men in Lisbon, Schroeder and Breisky, to get in touch with them. He said that they would have a German passport ready for me.

The doctor reported that Prince Wied, the German Minister to Stockholm, had come with a peace proposal from the Russians to SS Headquarters about the time of Stalingrand, and that von Papen had come with another one from Ankara in May 1943. The outlines of the proposals were that Germany should take about one-half the Baltic

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countries to the north of East Prussia; that Poland should be divided according to the 1939 lines; that Russia should demand the whole coast to the Black Sea, including the mouth of the Danube, and should go as far as Constantinople and Salonika, and should also have a port on the Adriatic. Ribbentrop and Goebbels had been in favor of accepting these proposals, while Himmler and Hitler were against them.

The Germens calculated that, if the Russians continued an all-out offensive, which they have in fact done, their reserves would be exhausted towards the end of April 1944, and that the Eastern Front might develop into a stale-mate in the summer of 1944.

The doctor also reported that British and American bombing of Germany was resulting in a very large increase in communism, as when people have their homes destroyed, as well as all their personal property, they are automatically thrown upon the state to provide them with everything they need.

Himmler's policy was that he intended to keep order in Germany under the existing government as long as

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possible, and was prepared to shoot 20 or 30 million Germans to do so. However, when the time came that he believed that further military resistance was futile, he intended to destroy all of the private property in the occupied countries and in Germany, in order to produce a mass wave of communism. He would then announce himself as a communist, and throw his lot in with the Russians. The Germans believed that, if it became necessary to do this, that with a superior technical ability and organizing capacity, they could succeed in dominating greater Russian population and obtaining control on the vast Russians resources.

I made no promises or comment to the doctor or the Colonel, beyond stating that I would try to get back to Washington and see that the matter was brought to the attention of the President.

While it is obvious that conferences with Himmler are loaded with potential dynamite, nevertheless, I believe that there are enormous possible advantages in such a trip:

1. A great deal could be learned about the

German frame of mind, and the relations of the important Germans with each other. The weak links in their armor in a material, psychological and personal sense could be better explored in this way than in any other.

2. The possibilities of provoking a "putsch" or civil war in Germany could be explored at first hand. It is possible that this, if successful, might save hundreds of thousands of lives in connection with the coming invasion.

The disadvantage of such a trip would be the capital which the Germans could make out of it in their own press and radio. However, they are in a position to do that anyway if they choose to lie about it. An untruth is a consideration which has never yet weighed with them.

I hope that full consideration will be given to the possibilities of such a trip, and I am, of course, ready to discuss the matter and amplify this report in any way that is desired.

PSF Safe O.S. S. Golden

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

July Wall

20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may find of interest the following report on the treatment of Russian prisoners in German prison camps.

At first, that is in 1941, the Russian prisoners were far more closely guarded than any others, and on the whole received far worse treatment. Most of them arrived in the prison camps in a pitiable condition. They were given completely inadequate food and practically no medical attention, and were forced to undertake heavy manual work, even though in most cases they were really too weak and too undernourished for this. Also the French and British prisoners were absolutely forbidden to do anything to help the Russian prisoners, but notwithstanding this there were many cases where the British and French shared their parcels with the Russians whenever they were able to get in contact with them.

The mortality among the Russian prisoners was

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extremely high, and there seemed no doubt that the German government in its treatment of Russian prisoners violated all international conventions and is responsible
for the death of thousands of Russians.

Those Russian prisoners who were eventually distributed in small groups on farms to help with the harvest and other farm work quickly gained the sympathy of the local population. People were tremendously struck with their extraordinary ability to learn German. Many spoke it better after two months than other prisoners after two years.

A great change has come about in the treatment of Russian prisoners dating from the initial Russian successes in December 1941. This is due in no small measure to the influence of the returning German soldiers who generally have a high admiration of their Russian opponents. My report refers to a characteristic incident which took place in the summer of 1943 at Karlsruhe, where a group of Russian and French prisoners were engaged in cleaning a street following a bombardment. A group of German soldiers from the East Front, disobeying all orders, went up

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to the Russian prisoners, engaged them in conversation, and offered them cigarettes, and when anybody gives a cigarette away in Germany, it means a good deal.

In 1943, the Germans, taking into account the fact that the Russians received no packages from abroad, started to give them even larger rations of bread than the other prisoners, and generally improved the rations given the prisoners. At the same time, there has been a very noted change in the attitude of the German civilian public toward the prisoners. In general, the Russian prisoners have retained their faith in Stalin and their absolute confidence in final victory. Russian prisoners never complain of the regime, and have been on the whole impervious to German propaganda. In general the Russian prisoners can read and write, and take great pride in their country.

It is remarkable to note how many simple workers and peasants among the Russians know about Russian literature and take a real interest in it. One of their first requests made to the German authorities was for reading material. The Germans have also been highly impressed

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with the qualifications of Russian technicians among the prisoners.

This above report, from someone who knows what he is talking about, generally conforms to other information on the subject which we have received.

William J. Donovan
Director

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PSF Safe

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I give you below a report regarding the situation in Germany on March 1st. Our representative says the following:

"I reproduce this as received; the ideas are not mine, but come from a good source. The destruction in Berlin is enormous, but it is extraordinary to observe the fatalism with which the inhabitants accept the new situation. Thousands of persons live in the mins, in cellars and in temporary shelters. At the beginning of the bombardment, there were many complaints. Now it seems the population is somewhat used to them. The common misfortune which all are sharing has the result that those who suffer are not openly complaining. The air bombardments have not caused any internal revolt. People are not any longer raising the question of who is responsible. The misery is so great and so general that it stifles reaction.

"Among persons above 40 years of age, i.e. those who have had knowledge of, or participated in, the war of 1914-18, there is a considerable proportion of anti-Hitler sentiment, even of defeatism. Persons of this generation are in open opposition to those of the generation which follows them, that is to say, those from 18 to 30

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years old, who are mostly out-and-out Nazis.

Now there is coming along a third generation

- the young people from 12 to 18, who are far
from being devoted to the present regime. In
a school in Wiesbaden recently, the scholars
agreed among themselves to beat up any of their
school comrades who gave the Hitler salute. This
young generation is not communist, because it
does not know what communism is, but it has in
it the elements of anarchism."

William J. Donovan Director

PSF Safe O.S. E. focder

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

20 March 1944

Miss Grace Tully The White House

Dear Grace:

I think the President will be interested in the attached memorandum. Will you
please hand it to him. Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C. 20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a digest of discussions had by a representative of ours with King Peter:

King Peter's sojourn in Cairo was both futile and difficult for the following reasons:

- (a) General Zivkovic was engaged in plots directed toward deposing Peter and placing Prince Tomislav, the brother of Peter, on the throne. Supposedly, Prince Tomislav is the bastard son of General Zivkovic and Queen Marie.
- (b) Yugoslav army officers have been going over to Marshal Tito.
- (c) Cabinet underlings have issued inflammatory decrees favoring General Mihailovic and
 have been affixing King Peter's signature to these
 decrees without his consent. This has made it hard
 to work for an understanding with Tito.

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(d) The British have followed a policy of keeping King Peter practically a prisoner. King Peter verified newspaper accounts reporting this fact, although he was forced to refute them publicly at the time.

The foregoing factors, as well as his desire to affect American and British policy in favor of General Mihailovic and to expedite his marriage were responsible for his wishing to go back to London.

The agreed policy of the Purich cabinet and King Peter is the backing of General Mihailovic not only as a force opposed to the Nazis but also as a guarantee of Peter's ultimate return to the Yugoslav throne. They are also agreed on the policy of securing material assistance for Mihailovic. King Peter is of the opinion that the American and British policy of allowing the Soviet Union to take the initiative will result in the Anglo-Americans losing

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a valuable sphere of influence. He claims that General Mihailovic's lack of activity has been caused by instructions from the Americans and British which urged him to save his strength until the invasion of Europe.

As a result of his discussion with Foreign Minister Eden, King Peter gained the impression that the British are in sympathy with these opinions, although they dare not take any action lest they affront the Soviet Union. King Peter feels that his only chance lies in the creation of a second front, which will give the British greater latitude of action. He feels that Eden, fundamentally, concurs with him, and he is optimistic that ultimately the problem of Yugoslavia will be solved in the way that he proposes.

King Peter intimated that if the British did not order him to do otherwise, he would keep Purich in his present position. He is extremely bitter against Simovic, whom he will not accept for a government position.

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A cable sent recently by Slovene groups, assuring him of their loyalty and backing has enheartened King Peter a good deal. This cable was relayed to him by the Vatican.

William J. Donovan Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will note that in Hewitt's statement, he refers to Bormann as having obtained a strong position in Germany. Below is a brief biography of Bormann, which may give you some information not heretofore available:

Martin Bormann occupies at the present time a position as head of the Party Chancellery of the Nazi Party and is a member of the Ministerial Consul for the Defense of the Reich. He acts as the Deputy of the Fuhrer. He has been described both as the No. 2 and the No. 3 Nazi, and along with Himmler, Goring, and Goebbels is alleged to be the fourth member of the group designated to take over the control of Germany in the event of the death of Hitler. Press accounts in Sweden and elsewhere state that Bormann is the most important Nazi next to Hitler.

Life: Bormann, the son of a Lutheran farmer,

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was born in Halberstadt on June 17, 1900. During the World War, he served in the artillery. After 1918, he became a student of agriculture and was appointed to manage an estate in Mecklenburg. He combined this work with activities in the Free Corps, as a member of the Ehrhardt Brigade and as section leader in the notorious Rossbach Brigade, terroristic military organizations which fought the Weimar Republic. In 1923, while still a member of the Rossbach group, he was convicted to committing a political murder and was sentenced to prison. After serving one year he was released. He immediately joined the Frontbann, as a racial para-military organization, and in 1925 became a member of the Nazi Party.

Position in Nazi Party: Bormann's rise to power was rapid in the Nazi Party. Two years after he joined the Party he became the Gau Press Chief (Gaupressobmann) in Thuringia. In 1928 he was appointed district leader and office manager (Bezirksleiter und Gaugeschaeftsfuehrer) in the Gau organization of Thuringia. In the same year he was made a member of the staff of the Supreme Command of the SA, a position

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which he held until 1930. He was also director of the Hilfskasse of the Nazi Party. In 1933, Bormann was made a member of the Reichstag and became Chief of Staff to the Deputy of the Fuchrer, Rudolf Hess (Stabsleiter des Stellvertreters des Fuehrers). Bormann worked with Hess in controlling Party affairs until the latter's flight to England. He holds the rank of Obergruppenfuhrer in both SS and SA, a Senior Group Leader.

After the flight of Hess, the office of Deputy
Fuhrer remained vacant. A new office, Leader of the Party
Chancellery (Leiter der Parteikanzlei) was created and Bormann was appointed to it. This office gives complete control over all Nazi Party affairs and the numerous party
bureaucracy to him.

Political Position: The political viewpoint and position of Bormann in Nazi Germany has been made the subject of many rumors. He represents the SS group and since 1942, has purged many government officials, replacing them with SS men. He was reported to be associated with SS extremist factions. His closest friend is alleged

to be General Zeitzler, an ardent Nazi who rose to prominence in the German army after the defeat at Stalingrad. Cables from Bern in October 1943 state that Bormann was associated with Goring in sponsoring peace proposals to the Soviet Union and that he has quarrelled with von Ribbentrop over German foreign policy. In internal affairs, Bormann has advocated complete SS control in Germany. He represents the pagan group and has always shown a violent opposition to religion. His reputation as an ardent Nazi is not only demonstrated by his prominent position in the Party, but also by his record of violence and murder in politics which dates officially from the time he was nineteen years old.

William 1. Donovan Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

21 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following notes consist mainly of statements of fact and generalizations about German troop
morale, based upon interrogations of P's/W at PWE 326,
Aversa, during the period of January 20 to February 20,
1944. Most of the generalizations have, however, been
checked with interrogators of long experience.

A. <u>VULNERABILITIES</u>.

- 1. <u>Non-Germans</u>. In the past six months, the Wehrmacht seems to have been making increasing use of Volksdeutsche for combat service. The proportion of these troops to Germans varies from unit to unit, from 2 or 3 percent to 20 percent (including Austrians). In descending order of numbers the various nationalities are as follows: Austrians, Alsace-Lorrainers, Poles, Czechs, and Russians. Desertions run high in these groups.
 - 2. Older men and men drawn from previously de-

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ferred Occupations. It is well known that the <u>Vehrmacht</u> is drawing more heavily upon men in the thirties, a good proportion of whom are skilled workers previously deferred. In the course of a series of interrogations of skilled workers, it was found that the overwhelming majority of these men have poor morale because:

- a. Many of them have families to worry about.
- b. They find the transition to army life difficult at their age.
- c. They worry about the future more than the average younger soldier.
- d. They feel that when skilled workers

 are called up things must be going very badly indeed.

 This group would be particularly susceptible to factual

 statements of production figures of the Allies, compared

 with facts about what is happening to the German production.
- 3. <u>Untrained Men</u>. Prisoners taken at the Anzio beachhead area brought reports that some of the units consisted of men who scarcely knew how to fire a gun. One

squadron leader reported that his group had been rushed to the front from a supply and quartermaster battalion and were completely unprepared for combat. Morale among these men was very low. When the time came for a counterattack only two out of ten men followed him from the holes in which they were lying.

Cassino, supplies come in irregularly because of the difficulty of the terrain and heavy artillery fire. Sectors in which these conditions prevail might be singled out by MO, but attacks would have to be carefully timed. In general, the supply situation seems to be fairly well in hand. There are remarkably few complaints about food from P's/W. The two most important items are cigarettes and Commisbrod. The latter especially occupies an important position in soldier morale. All P's/W, when comparing their food in the camp with that in the Wehrmacht, mention that the slab of white bread given them with meals at the camp is no substitute for Commisbrod, which is very filling.

In every other respect the food at the camp is

considered superior to their food in the Wehrmacht.

Even the fanatics admit this.

- 5. The absence of the "Luftwaffe". The average P/W, though he admits the absence of air support in Italy, does not interpret this as very significant. P's/W whose morale was good before capture fall into the following categories on the matter:
 - a. The High Command knows what it is doing. If there is no <u>Luftwaffe</u> around there is good reason for it.
 - b. Some are more explicit, saying the reason is that it is being saved up for a future plan, or it is needed worse in Russia. The general state of mind expressed by P's/W suggests that the absence of the <u>Luftwaffe</u> is not a very important morale factor because it is not clearly interpreted as a sign of a serious breakdown. To make a successful attack on this theme, it would have to be shown that the <u>Luftwaffe</u> is not in Italy because the GAF simply doesn't have the planes.

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Factual reports of bombing of aircraft plants in Germany without further comment might be more effective in this line than any propaganda editorializing.

- 6. The Officers. The average P/W has very little to say about officers of the Wehrmacht in general. He forms his opinion on the basis of his own immediate officers and on things he hears from his comrades in the battalion. The following reports from P's/W on officers do, however, exhibit characteristics general enough to form the basis of an MO attack:
 - a. The veteran soldiers do not think highly of the newer corps of officers. This is more significant than the typical "Second Looey" or "brasshat" gripe. It is based on comparison in combat conditions with previous campaigns.
 - b. It is commonly understood that officers must have political views favored by the
 party in order to get any place. Among the
 soldiers who are fed up with the party this had
 important implications in their relations with
 officers. Officers trained in NAPOLI have an

unsalubrious reputation, even with the unpolitical soldiers.

- c. Apart from the usual "tough officer" yarn, two types of anti-officer stories recurr in interrogations.
 - i. Stories of officers "collecting" large amounts of silks, linens, etc. to send home from Italy.
 - ii. Stories of officers lying to their troops about the strength and/or nature of the forces opposing them. Rare instances of cruelty on the part of officers might also be exploited.
- 7. Worries about Home. With the exception of worries about aerial bombardment these worries follow the usual pattern of soldier worries. Mail service appears to be adequate and spot-censored so that the soldiers in general feel they are getting news from their friends and relatives which is dependable and unworried by censorship. The Nazi propaganda line about the indescriminate bombing of civilians by the Allies appears

to have had a minor boomerang effect on the soldiers.

It is difficult to assess it, but the impression created by P's/W is that it has caused them to worry more than it has increased their determination to fight. It should be remembered, however, that prisoners are not ideal sources of information on this theme.

One worry about home does not seem to be very widespread. No instance of a prisoner who was afraid that his wife or girl was deceiving him with a foreign worker, French or other nationality has been encountered. Though this is difficult to discuss in interrogations, it never seems to have been the subject of conversations among the troops, nor are there any stories at the expense of "other guys". On the other hand, there is a good proportion of stories about French, Dutch, and Belgian girls and German soldiers. However, if any news stories from German papers on this theme can be found, it might be worth a try.

8. Frictions among the troops. Among the average run of troops, front line experience seems to make

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ordinary frictions disappear in the general atmosphere of "we are all in the thing together". Tolerance of one's comrades is outstanding. There are no evidences that religious or regional frictions play a significant role in troop morale. Apart from the German-non-German split, the only others worth mentioning are the dislike of the fanatical Nazies who make any kind of frank discussion of the war or politics unpleasant, if not dangerous, and the dislike of the SS. The large majority of the soldiers, however, are fighting as "good Germans" and "doing their duty". The sense of sharing their troubles and the general front line cameraderie is much stronger than political or social differences.

9. <u>Vergeltung</u>. The long-promised <u>Vergeltung</u> is no longer taken seriously by the majority of the troops, and has given rise to a considerable number of jokes. The few who do believe in it neither constitute a worthwhile target nor is it likely that they would be susceptible to any sort of propaganda. The best possibility offered by this theme is as a part of another attack in which a humorous <u>Vergeltung</u> reference might be

effective.

- soldier is confident that if he is captured he will be well handled. American captivity has an especially good reputation, with the English a close second. Some of the prisoners from Cassino report that there were rumors that the Goums took no prisoners. In general, however, a good treatment is taken for granted. So much so that a few instances in which officers tried to harden their troops for combat by stories of bad treatment in captivity were reported by P's/W to have been flat failures. Propaganda making use of captivity promises should therefore avoid gilding the lily or even direct appeals based on its attractions, but should rather regard it as well established credit.
- ll. The Secret Weapon. The belief in a secret weapon of some sort is still fairly strong and the number of versions of what it is attest to the fact that it is a frequent subject of conversation. Prisoners have described it as a radio-guided plane which is one large bomb, a death ray, a new gas, a super long range rocket bomb, an "elec-

trical gun", and as an "atomic" bomb. It is significant that the number who regard it as a joke is far smaller than those who laugh at <u>Vergeltung</u>. The major weaknesses in the belief are the delay in its appearance and the large number of versions as to what it is.

B. STRENGTHS

1. Hopelessness of defeat. One of the major factors making for a stronger morale than one might otherwise expect is the feeling on the part of the average German that he is now fighting to save Germany from annihilation. He is fighting as a German and, as noted above, this tends to subordinate the whole Nazi question. If there were some inkling of hope for a defeated Germany, the appeal to stop dying for Hitler might have more effect; at present, however, the sense of doing his duty as a German is strong enough to put the disgust with the party, which many of them feel, definitely in the background. Blaming the party for the war also becomes comparatively unimportant to them. What matters is that if Germany loses the war she is done for. A majority of the prisoners no

longer believe in the possibility of a German victory.

Many still think she can mond'out in they and light tend?

Others just don't see anything else to do.

- 2. Sense of Duty. Many prisoners are frank to admit that they do not like the war and would be glad to see it over quickly. They are unaware of any political implications, but are fighting simply because "It is their duty". This state of mind fits in with the one described above, but with many soldiers it is not causally related. That is, they usually describe themselves as "little people" and "unpolitical". The issues involved are not clear to them and they are relatively unaffected by Nazism. They went to war simply because the authorities told them it was necessary and it was their duty to respond. This group is generally unaffected by anti-Nazi or other ideological and political propaganda. Many of them come from agricultural districts, but the type is by no means confined to the peasantry.
- 3. Pride in being a good soldier. The average soldier is conscious of the fact that the German fighting

is an excellent one. He feels that his unit is more than a match for the enemy's. He takes pride in the efficiency and discipline of the troops.

William J. Donovan

Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C. 24 March 1944 file 1

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Miss Grace Tully The White House

Dear Grace:

I attach a secret paper which I think the President will want to know about. Will you please hand it to him. Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan Director

By Authority of CIA,007622

Letter of 6-26-73

By SR Date JUL 6 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a secret paper which has been seen by no one but you. It contains a course of action that was discussed in the event the Bulgarian Government does not pull out of the war willingly.


> William J. Donovan Director

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By Authority of CIA,007622

| letter of 6-26-73
| By SR Date JUL 6 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 23, 1944.

SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN:

- l. As requested by you this morning, I outline below certain facts not contained in the formal report of the mission of today's date, regarding my personal and intimate discussions with Monsieur Balabanoff, apart from the more formal relations which he had with the members of the mission. These facts are not known to my colleagues, and they are written here only for your information and that of the highest political authorities.
- 2. My principal effort, as you know, was to accomplish by mutual agreement the detachment of Bulgaria from the Axis. It was clear to me and to Monsieur Balabanoff that this might be impossible and that it might be necessary to consider forcible means. We discussed this problem fully. I asked him, in particular, whether he was prepared and able to form, with the Army, a new government to replace the present government and take control of the country. He replied that if necessary he was entirely ready to act in this way but that he first wished to try to convince the present government it should withdraw from the Axis, since he wished to avoid the horror of civil war in Bulgaria, and almost certain consequent occupation by Germany. If his friendly efforts failed, he said he would approach the Army with a view to a coup d'etat, pointing out to me, however, that no coup d'etat could succeed without the material aid from outside Bulgaria. He said that neither he nor the military leaders were in a position to supply the necessary material and that as a large number of army officers and government officials were now receiving regular supplementary compensation from Germany, some substitute arrangement must be made to continue this supplementary compensation since, in existing circumstances, their regular allowance from the Bulgarian government is wholly inadequate for their essential I replied that I could not make any definite promises in the name of the United States, but that if he could satisfy me that in fact he could actually obtain the necessary support

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for a successful coup d'etat, I would guarantee, from my personal fortune, a certain amount of money for the accomplishment of the end in view. He then stated that it was not a question of a sum which I could provide from my own funds, since the amount involved would be considerable, pointing out that it would be a question of life and death for many Bulgarian leaders, and the problem of supporting their families if they were killed. In addition, he remarked that as a private individual I could not supply the armament and munitions that would be needed since, at the present time, all Bulgarian military stocks are rigidly controlled by the Germans. In this connection, however, he told me it would be entirely possible to corrupt the German officers in control of Bulgarian army supplies and that in fact he had already perfected arrangements to that end, but that he lacked the essential funds. He also said that given a signal from the Allies that they were ready to land in reasonable force, his arrangements were such that he could encircle the German troops as they were then disposed in Bulgaria, and effect their capture or destruction by the Bulgarian army.

I asked Monsieur Balahanoff what specific assistance in money and material would be needed. He replied he could give no exact estimate but that a possible measure would be sufficient funds to maintain the army for three months. As the present military budget represents about \$200,000,000, this would mean about \$50,000,000, to which should be added some \$10,000,000 for use with high non-military officials. ously most of these funds would be spent in Levas but dollar exchange of perhaps \$10,000,000 should be reserved for payments outside Bulgaria. These estimates are on the basis of a coup d'etat against the Regency. If the Regency can be persuaded to participate in the new government, some provision must be made for their support. I might point out that for payments in Levas a special issue of currency could be printed in Washington and that this would require the provision of no immediate dollar equivalent. If necessary, I can assure you, in the strictest confidence, with the names of the army and government officials through whom Monsieur Balabanoff would make the necessary arrangements.

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Letter of 6-26-73

By SR Date JUL 6 1973





- 4. In addition, to covering the military and political considerations, I obtained directly from Bishop Andre the promise that he would arrange with the Synod all the necessary propaganda against Germany, in favor of the Allies (particularly the U. S.), either in support of the present government, if it joined the Allies, or in support of a new government favorable to the Allies which might be formed by Monsieur Balabanoff under a coup d'etat. There were two conditions to bishop Andre's promise: first, that Monseigneur Stephan (President of the Synoa) should be the president of the new Regency, if a new Regency were established, and second, that Monseigneur Neofit should be one of the Regents and hold the position of tutor to the King. To enable the first step to be taken without further delay, I personally provided Bishop Andre with the necessary credits through my former banking connections in Eulgaria. Should, however, the program be continued by direction of the Allies, any necessary further expenditures would, of course, be beyond my means and funds must be available from U. S. government sources.
- 5. To summarize, while the Balkan situation has changed greatly since my discussions with Monsieur Balabanoff and Bishop Andre, I still feel it is possible to accomplish the withdrawal of Bulgaria from the Axis, either by persuasion or by a coup d'etat, and in either case, the support of the Church, which I have arranged, would practically assure popular acceptance of the new government. Any policy directed to these ends, however, must be flexible and adjustable to changes in general political situation and it is, of course, essential that any such policy be agreed to in advance by the United States, Great Britain and Russia. In so far as Russia is concerned, I should add that the Russian Ambassador to Turkey informed Monsieur Balabanoff that he knew of my conversations with him and that he wished to advise him to go ahead quickly and complete the arrangements which the United States were trying to make through me.

If I can be of any further service, you have only to command me.

A. K.

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By Authority of CIA, CO7622

Letter of 6-26-73

By SR Date III 6 1973



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C.



24 March 1944

Miss Grace Tully, The White House, Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Would you be good enough to see that the President sees the attached memorandum.

Thank You.

Sincerely,

Illiam J. Donovan,

Director

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of C/A, 007622

| Letter of 6-26-73

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C.

23 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I attach a copy of a report submitted to me today by the group that was sent to establish connections with the Bulgarian representatives in Turkey.

William J. Donovan

Director

Enclosure

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By Authority of CIA, 007622

Letter of 6-26-75

By SR Date 1973

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C.

23 March 1944

General William J. Donovan Director, Office of Strategic Services Washington, D. C.

The undersigned members of the Special Mission sent pursuant to your instructions to the Middle and Near East last November for the purpose of establishing contact with Bulgarian authorities to ascertain whether Bulgaria could be detached from the Axis and brought to the side of the United Nations have the honor to report:

- (1) The Mission reached Istanbul on 1 December 1943 and shortly thereafter opened communication with persons in Sofia with the result that the Bulgarian Prime Minister telegraphed M. Balabanoff, Bulgarian Minister to Turkey, requesting him to get in touch with Mr. Kouyoumdjisky. On 18 December, Mr. Kouyoumdijisky met M. Balabanoff in Ankara at the latter's request. M. Balabanoff, who is a close friend of Mr. Kouyoumdjisky, spoke with him frankly of Bulgaria's mistake in joining the Axis and asked if Mr. Kouyoumdjisky were in a position to help Bulgaria. Mr. Kouyoumdjisky replied that he could not discuss that matter with M. Balabanoff at that time, but that if qualified representatives of the Bulgarian Government should be sent to Istanbul he would confer with them. He suggested that the Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, M. Gouneff, and General Popoff (both close friends of Mr. Kouvoumdjisky's) might advantageously be the persons chosen. M. Balabanoff said he would telegraph and recommend such action to Sofia.
- (2) No reply having been received from M. Balabanoff, the Mission made a second direct approach to Sofia toward the end of December. This time sending word to the Opposition Leaders, M. Mouchanoff and Bouroff (both likewise good friends of Mr. Kouyoumdjisky's). These men sent

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s special messenger to report it was impossible for them to cross the frontier personally but they would welcome further information from Mr. Kouyoumdjisky. The desired information was later forwarded to them and we know that they brought their influence to bear on the Government to act.

- (3) On 29 January 1944, M. Balabanoff informed Mr. Kouvoumdjisky that he was in Istanbul en route to Sofia where his Government had recalled him urgently and that he was certain he would be questioned further about his discussions with Mr. Kouyoumdjisky. The latter pointed out that there had been no reply to the communication sent pursuant to his request of 13 December and that in such circumstances he had nothing additional to say. M. Balabanoff replied that he felt Bulgaria had made many serious errors of policy and that it was necessary that she withdraw from her present unhappy position as soon as possible. He said he would do his best in Sofia to persuade his Government to act favorable and that he hoped Mr. Kouyoumdjisky as a Bulgarian by birth would continue to help. Kouyoumdjisky stated he would do his utmost provided he received through M. Balabanoff a definite proposal from the Bulgarian Government.
- (4) On 4 February, M. Balabanoff returned to Istanbul and arranged to meet Mr. Kouyoumdjisky the next day. At that meeting he said he had spoken at length with the Minister President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Heads of the most important political parties and the most important representatives of the Press, and in addition had talked with the Regents as a group and individually. He stated that he was convinced he had been able to change their views and to make them decide to change the present Bulgarian policy and to attempt to make an approach to the Allies. He added that the Regents and the Government had authorized and instructed him to inform Mr. Kouyoumdjisky that they understood the necessity for changing their policy and of getting rid of their Axis connection. He also said that he was authorized to state that the Regents and the Government were in agreement to discuss this sub-

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| Letter of 6-36-73

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ject with the United States and asked Mr. Kouyoumdjisky what should next be done. Mr. Kouyoumdjisky replied that he wanted to know what the Bulgarian Army thought, whether the Regents had the Army with them and if so whether the Army would join the Allied Armies in expelling the Germans from Bulgaria at the proper moment. M. Balabanoff replied that the Army followed the Government and that there would be no difficulty on that score. He said he would telegraph to Sofia to send immediately two authorized representatives to discuss details. Mr. Kouyoumdjisky and M. Balabanoff then considered at some length the identity of appropriate representatives.

In the course of this conversation, M. Balabanoff observed that Bulgaria's principal preoccupation was lest the country be destroyed and dismembered and that while he understood that no territorial questions could be considered, he wanted to record that view.

M. Balabanoff also expressed the hope that the Mission would do whatever might be necessary to suspend the bombing pending the selection and arrival of Bulgarian representatives in Istanbul. He was informed that an appropriate telegram would be sent to Washington.

On 6 February, M. Balabanoff received Mr. Kouyoumdjisky and Major Gurfein and confirmed in substance his conversation of the previous day with Mr. Kouyoumdjisky reiterating that he had the definite mandate from his Government to discuss this matter and that he would communicate immediately with his Government asking that authorized representatives be sent at once. He also urged the greatest discretion on the part of all concerned lest word of the negotiations should reach the Germans.

(5) No reply having been received from Sofia through M. Balabanoff, he was visited again in Istanbul on 28 February by Mr. Kouyoumdjisky and Colonel Jadwin who then met him for the first time and identified himself as former Military Attache in Bulgaria. The introduction of Colonel Jadwin at this time made it possible for the Mission to emphasize the increasing official

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significance of its representation. In reply to Mr. Kouyoumdjisky's questions M. Balabanoff was unable to give any satisfactory explanation for the silence of his Government. He asked with obvious concern, however, whether the bombing of Sofia would be resumed if the Bulgarian Government sent no Mission. He was told this was purely military matter and could not be discussed. M. Balabanoff then asked if his Government could not send a small preliminary Mission could they send a large Mission to discuss details to which an affirmative answer was given. The possible identity of the Representatives was discussed as was the best place for a meeting. It wasagain emphasized by Mr. Kouyoumdjisky and Colonel Jadwin that any representatives must have a definite mandate from their Government. M. Balabanoff stated he would urge his Government again to take immediate action, pointing out that in his judgment negotiations should be started at once.

(6) For reasons of security -- there had been newspaper publicity in Istanbul regarding "peace feelers" without, however, specific reference to this Mission -and also for psychological reasons the Mission decided to withdraw temporarily from Turkey. Accordingly, on 9 March Major Gurfein and Mr. Kouyoumdjisky left for Cairo and Colonel Jadwin followed a few days later after stopping in Ankara to deliver to M. Balabanoff the special message from the Secretary of State which you cabled to the Mission to the effect that if the Bulgarian Government should send a Mission to Cairo they would be received by representative of Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. M. Balabanoff seemed much pleased at this information and stated he would inform his Government immediately. It was explained to him that the message came from the highest authority, whereupon he observed that his Government should select important persons as members of the Mission and that they should be of such caliber and have such authority that they could discuss the matter from all angles. He was assured that the necessary transportation arrangements could be made if his Government should appoint a Mission and it was agreed with him that any further communication on the subject should be sent by him

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Letter of 6-26-73

By SR Date JUL 6 1973

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to Consul General Berry in Istanbul who would immediately communicate it to the State Department in Washington.

It should be noted in connection with the foregoing that several important political developments occurred in the interval after the conversation between M. Balabanoff and Mr. Kouyoumdjisky of 5 February and the arrival of the Secretary of State's message and that these developments greatly confused the general situation. For example, the Finnish-Russian peace negotiations did not progress rapidly, and the Italian campaign was obviously meeting with difficulty, Marshal Tito declared himself in favor of a free and independent Macedonia and negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey reported in the Press to be leading to Turkey's entrance into the war broke down with the departure of the British Mission from Ankara. All of these events could obviously color the judgment of Bulgaria as to the proper time for acting in concert with the Allies. Moreover, certain Bulgarian officials delivered speeches on territorial questions even though it had been made clear to M. Balabanoff that such questions were out of order at that moment.

It is our judgment, however, that the Mission's primary objective has been accomplished, namely, the establishment of direct contact with the Bulgarian Government, the determination that in principle the Bulgarian Government desired to desert the Axis and the provision of a channel through which arrangements could be made for the dispatch of a Bulgarian Mission to Cairo to meet with British, American, and Russian delegates. We are of the opinion:

- That the desire of the Bulgarian Government to join the Allies is sincere.
- 2. That action by Bulgaria in joining the Allies would be greatly accelerated if Bulgaria could be assured that there was no disposition on the part of the Allies to destroy and dismember her or to prevent the continuance of the present dynasty provided the Bulgarian people

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By Authority of CIA, 007622

Letter of 6-26-73

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decide in favor of the dynasty and that ultimate consideration of Bulgaria's claim to her 1912 boundaries is not definitely excluded.

- 3. That further considerable pressure could be brought on Bulgaria if she were informed that widespread bombing of Bulgarian targets would be resumed if prompt steps were not taken to send qualified representatives to Cairo.
- 4. That it would have immense effect on Bulgaria's action if it were known that the Allies were prepared to furnish men and materiel to assist in the expulsion of the Germans and the protection of Bulgaria from German reprisals. This consideration has particular significance at this moment in view of the Russian advance into Roumania and the reported occupation of Hungary by Germany.
- 5. That through Mr. Kouyoumdjisky and the contacts and connections established by him a practicable method now exists for the communication to the Bulgarian Government and influential individuals of the views of the Allies on the above or any other subjects which might influence Bulgaria in taking prompt action,

and we await your further instructions.

Respectfully yours,

Angel Kouyoumdjinsky C. C. Jadwin, Col., GSC Murray I. Gur Major, AUS

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By Authority of CIA, 007622

| Letter of 6-26-73

By SR Date JUL 6 1973



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 March 1944

Miss Grace Tully The White House

Dear Grace:

I am sending you a memorandum for the President. Will you please see that he gets it. Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan Director

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CIA Itr 11/27/74

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C.


25 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From our London office, we learn the following:

- 1. Effort is being made to construct the basis of a new government which will stand for the potential middle element between Tito and Purich. There are daily conversations in which the following persons participate: Snoj, Banjanin Vilder, Srdjan Budislavljevic, Milan Grol, Bogulyub Jeftitch, Slobodan Jovanovic, and Captain Kern. The first three are Serbs from Croatia or Bosnia, the second three are Serbs from Serbia. No Croats have been asked to participate in the discussions to date, on the theory that agreement must first be reached among the Serbian factions. Lambda is sure that Sutuj will join the group, but doubts that Krnjevic will do so.
 - 2. The group's program is approximately as follows:
 - a. Maintenance of friendly terms with the USSR.
 - b. Minailovic to be ultimately replaced as War Minister by a civilian. Grol might be his

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
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successor.

- c. Ultimate establishment of friendship with the Partisans.
- d. Complete support to a Federal Yugoslavia, to which Bosnia would be added as the fourth unit, independent of both Zagreb and Belgrade.
- 3. Neither the King nor the British Foreign Office has been contacted by this group as yet; such steps, however, are planned to be taken very soon. They are afraid that more radical concessions to Tito will be insisted upon by the British, but the group is not ready at the present time to accept persons appointed by Tito into the new government. They feel that because cabinet members accompanied the King to London, there will be significant changes in the immediate future. Purich, Cicin Saint, and Milecevic are among the members who met with him. Serbs in London no longer resent the King's marriage."

William J. Donovan Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

27 March 1944

Miss Grace Tully The Phite House Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Would you please be kind enough to bring to the attention of the President the attached memorandum on the Polish situation?

Sincerely,

William ... Donovan Director

Attachment

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E), and 5(D) or (D)

CIA Itr 1/27/74

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

27 March 19/4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

From one of our members dealing with the Polish underground and with British SOE, I have received the following report which you may find of interest:

1. The Polish Premier, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, a a representative Polish Peasant from Western Poland, formerly Chairman of the Agricultural Cooperative movement in Posnania, is respected.

He has made a good impression on British Cabinet
Ministers, including Mr. Eden, and on other Government officials as well as in British Parliamentary and press circles.
He is considered a calm and straightforward statesman,
reliable and of sound judgment. He has convinced the
British that he sincerely desires an understanding with
Soviet Russia within the framework of United Nations unity,
with the purpose of giving to the Polish Underground Army
and the Polish people the possibility of effectively pursuing
their fight on Polish territory against the common enemy,
Germany.

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- 2. Premier Mikolajczyk has stated that he cannot act contrary to the will of the Polish people by making concessions irreconcilable with Poland's sovereign rights. He claims this would be repudiated by the Polish people and therefore become valueless to the United Mations, including the Soviets.
- 3. The Poles feel that mediation exclusively conducted by Prime Minister Churchill without the participation of the United States places the Polish Government in a somewhat difficult situation with the Polish people.
- 2. Recently the Authorities of the Polish underground, who had been informed of the pending visit to President Roosevelt of Premier Mikolajczyk, have asked the latter for explanations as to why he had postponed his visit, and expressed anxiety that the Polish Government was not maintaining the close contacts with the United States Government previously maintained by the late Premier General Sikorski.
- 5. We have been informed from reliable sources that Ambassador Ciechanowski, who spent three weeks in

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London, has been given a personal letter from Premier Mikolajczyk to the President, presenting the case of Poland. The Ambassador has also been instructed to ask that the President receive Premier Mikolajczyk on a short visit to Washington. The proposed visit would help dispel the undesirable impression created in Poland, among the Polish people abroad and among Americans of Polish descent, that the President and the United States Government had lost all interest in the fate of Poland and had entirely abandoned it to the British Government.

William J. Donovan



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SECTION SECTION

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27 March 1944

Miss Grace Tully The White House Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Would you be good enough to see that the President sees the attached memorandum.

Sincerely

William J. Donovan Director

E. O. 11852, Sec. 2(8) and 5(1) or (3)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C.



27 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a cable received from our Istanbul representative, transmitting information concerning Rumania's request for assistance.

William J. Donovan

Director

DECT ASSITTED

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

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For Donovan from Istanbul.

The material below was given us by SOE to relay to you. March 24th the following message, dated Herch 22nd from Budapest, reached Ankara: "With the King of Rumania's permission, Maniu asks that you place the matter below before representatives of the United States and Britain, realizing that every sign points to Rumania being requested, as Hungary was, to accept German troops in their country and that Germany will try to establish still firmer collaboration and will try in overy way possible to force Rumania to expend more


Insofar as it related to Allied interest, Germany's occupation of Rumania on the heels of her occupation of Hungary and to be followed by her occupation of Bulgaria, will indicate the completion of Germany's proparations for Balkan defense. We must know, to give us acme busis upon which to organize the possibility of trying to regist German occupation, if we can depend upon a minimum of assistance from Americans and Dritish, We supreciate the fact that we cannot plan immediately upon a military operation of any considerable since Nowever, limited but prompt assistance from air forces and air borne troops could at least be considered.

To provide for the eventuality of a rotreat to Yugoslavia, resistence would be attempted in the zone at Cltamia and the Danab,

It is possible that a mass invasion of Pamania by the Garan Lorces way we postponed for a little while until the Germans are well established in Rungary. Consequently, it is not too late even now to naire arrungements for military assistance from the U.S. and Dritain.

I have not told anyone in the Moditerranean Theater about the foregoing; an depending upon you to take action on it.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES PAGE

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

ISTAMBUL

OM

TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REF. NO.

To appears that Colombia the in Establish less strained with Eritain SOE to negure objected that copies of communications between British and Rumanians, Summerized the messages show:

Mossage #1 relates his neeting with the Governments of the Allies.

Message #2 recormends that no controversies be permitted with the Rungarian people.

Message #3 contains a strong recommendation to have both Thai Antonescu and Carshel Antonescu give up the idea of visiting Hitler, since their absence might serve as the opportunity to cease control of the country. In addition this message says Mihai Antonescu and larshal Antonesca should not take any action without first discussing it with the Allied governments.

Message #61 from Paniu to SOE is a request for a statement of the extent of the assistance which the Allies are ready to offer. Message #62 reports the receipt of the 1st messages from Sterbey and the decision of Harshal Antonescu not to make a stand on the Dmeister. Message #65 reports that Mihai Antonescu and Marshal Antonescu have received instructions to visit Hitler, against which he had previously warned then. Hossage #65, dated the 23rd, reports that both Tihai Antonescu and Marshal Antonescu have put off their visit for the time


A message from Wilson for Haniu warned strongly against having ! Mhai Antonoscu and Marshal Antonoscu visit Hitler.

Message for SCE from Marshal Antonescu through Cristoscu asks for the Allies' reaction to the latest developments within Hungary, and asks for a statement of the political and military assistance which can be guaranteed. Crizbeson also says that he does not think that the Cortans are in control in Hungary. He goes on to say that the danger of an attack by the Hungarians is apparently removed, and that Rumania now has before her the suprome choice without having any idea as to how much assistance she can be assured or what to

March 34th cable #39 for you and Sterbey from Manlu. "Cable #2 from Stordey, parts I through S and cable #01, parts 1 through 3 from you reached here after Marshal Antonesca and Mihai Antonesca bed left for Mitler. They will continue the war against the Allies in in agreement with Mitler. Then, Haniu has firmly decided to react by unseating Marshal Antonesou. He wants to know upon what Allied mid he can depend in this case. Decharlelon is well as ere site & officers, also". DECLASSIFIED

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
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C.

3 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached reports add to our knowledge of the present state of affairs in France. They were received from an OSS representative in Spain.

William J. Donovan Director





REPORT FROM ARGUS TO REGIS ON CONVERSATIONS WITH FRENCH RESISTANCE LEADER

Today I had two long talks with one of the important leaders of the French Resistance Movement. He is motivated by determination to drive German forces from French soil and is not, unlike many others, occupied with details of internal French politics. He crossed the Pyrenees the first week in February and is in Spain clandestinely en route to Algiers. The heads of the French Mission here and the French Red Cross both vouch for him. I shall refer to him as "Delphi". The following facts were brought out in conversation, principally in answer to specific questions:

Attitude of members of French Resistance Movement toward Americans:

All branches, particularly those in the Maquis, are becoming increasingly disillusioned with the British and Americans. This feeling is being replaced by growing admiration for the Russians, who are considered alone to be bearing the brunt of military operations against the German Army. There is disappointment over the lag in Italy, and Allied generalship is criticized as "No better than the French that lost the Battle of France." Delphi believes this feeling will vanish as soon as a successful invasion of France is begun from the West and that the Allied Armies will meet with support from a unified France beyond anything that was either promised or

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imaginable in 1940.

Delphi warned against additional "insulting" explanatory propaganda, which only provokes the reaction "Words, words, more When are they coming?" There was bitter reaction against the recent "alerte"* from London and Algiers, which was interpreted by patriots to indicate Allied military operations for approximately February 15. French patriots, particularly in the Alps and in Northern and Southern section of the Atlantic Coast area, responded The German police and their Vichy-French allies were watching for such activity, and numerous resistance leaders were arrested. Many Resistance Organizations have had to be reorganized under new leaders. Delphi urged unequivocally that no further calls-to-arms be made until time is ripe for action under a carefully prepared strategic plan. He is going to Algiers and then to London to bring this matter to the attention of the proper authorities.

Needs of Resistance Groups

The essential needs now are arms accompanied by instructions for their use. Only one-fourth of the enlisted strength of the Maquis is armed. Its members are strong, fairly well-fed and adequately clothed, but need pre D-Day training in use of such small arms as will be made available to them. Earlier reports about insufficient food and clothing were dismissed by Delphi as pre-1941, before the underground had discovered how to secure

*Comment: This was not an announcement, but a call to prepare for D-Day.

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supplies from the Vichy Police, Army and Youth Organization stocks. He cited instances of raids on warehouses to obtain blankets which were made into uniforms, how Youth Organization leaders of the "Compagnon de France" turned over shoes to the Maquis; how cattle was slaughtered for food and stocks of fuel destroyed after removing that needed by the Maquis. The only real need is arms, ammunition and radios for communication.

I told Delphi that I had heard there was sentiment against arming the Resistance Movement due to acts of banditry committed by common criminals under the guise of membership in the Maquis, and that these acts had aroused antagonism of the average Frenchman against the Resistance movement. He attributed these statements to HENRIOT, Vichy Minister of Propaganda, and DARNAND, the new Police Chief, as a means of discrediting the Maquis. Delphi stated that in regions where the Maquis was dominant, it maintained law and order. He cited the punishment of individuals for clandestine slaughter of beef cattle for sale on the Black Market. He cited other instances reminiscent of the activities of the Night Riders in the South during the Reconstruction Period.

French Estimate of American Attitude, and Reaction of Different French Groups.

Delphi stated that the average intelligent Frenchman believed the American Government still had some sympathy for Vichy,


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and did not have a "violent aversion" to Vichy or even to LAVAL. Only on this basis could they explain our reticence in dealing officially with DE GAULLE. It was widely rumored in France that the United States had planned to unite all Frenchmen by persuading MARSHAL PETAIN to proceed to North Africa to set up his Government there at the time of the invasion of Algeria. Delphi said that would have been the best solution for France and that DE GAULLE would then have joined forces with the MARSHAL. However, PETAIN was either too old, too cowardly or too closely held a prisoner by his entourage and the Germans to take this one logical and patriotic step. PETAIN now has no political importance in the active sense.

Since the plan to effect an understanding between PETAIN and DE GAULLE did not succeed, it is believed in France that the State Department, with the approval of PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, is seeking a new intermediary solution between DE GAULLE and what is left of Vichy. CHAUTEMPS in America is supposed to have access to PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT and to be urging a deal with ex-leaders of the French Parliament who are still in France, such as ANATOLE DE MONZI and HERRIOT, if the latter is not too old. With these are usually grouped (in present French opinion) certain Synarchiste industrialists and bankers, particularly of the Banque d'Into-Chine group, such as BAUDOUIN and LAURENT. These politicians, industrialists

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and bankers are supposed to be the chosen group for the transitional government of a liberated France. These rumors still persisted at the end of January.

Although I told Delphi I was convinced the facts were different from the plan he reported, he thought it would be of value to outline the reactions of various sections of French opinion to any such plan. He stated that apart from the bankers, industrialists and politicians mentioned, there exists no group in France which would accept with approval any such program.

The important political groups (other than underground) are collaborationist, and represent only 40,000 individuals.

These collaborationist groups are:

- The PPF (Partie Populaire Francaise), led by DORIOT.
- The RNP (Rassemblement Nationale Populaire), led by DEAT.
- The police and armed "Milice", now controlled by DARNAND with active German support.
- 4. The organized press, directed by JEAN LUCHAIRE.

Until September 1943 these groups struggled among themselves for privileges under German protection. The overwhelming opposition of the people and the growing power of organized resistance forced these groups to present a program in Paris to the

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Germans. This program included (1) introduction of their leaders into the Vichy Government; (2) Cleansing (epuration) of the French administration to make room for a nuclei of their supporters and (3) the arming of the "Milice" and its integration into a single, armed, repressive force.

It is believed that the Germans accepted this plan, but insisted that LAVAL be kept as an indispensable political leader. None of the leaders of these groups has had sufficient political experience to govern, even as a puppet. If LAVAL is not kept, the Germans would have to impose a Gauleiter on France, and all French collaborationism would disappear.

The first result of German acceptance was to make DAFMAND head of the State Police. He was entrusted with repression of patriot activities. HENRIOT, the active spokesman of this group, was placed in charge of French propaganda and radio activities, and the "Milice" has been organized in the Morthern Zone, hitherto closed to French police forces.

DARNAND was a great French patriot. He served brilliantly in both wars, as a non-com and Lieutenant in World War I (where he won every French decoration for bravery) and was one of the outstanding leaders of the Corps Francs, and in the present war. He apparently has become an opportunist upon whose vanity LAVAL and others have been able to play. Today there is no more convinced and dangerous a pro-German leader in France.

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Opposed to these collaborationist elements are the great mass of French people. The group of greatest importance is the large group of intelligent men and women, mostly professional people, between 30 and 40, who make up the intellectual elite. Prior to 1939 their interest in politics was negative; now they. lead the resistance. While opposed to Synarchism on the one hand, they are equally opposed to the return of the pre-war form of parliamentary government. They favor State Socialism for all industries of national importance (railways, electrical power, insurance companies, mines, etc.) Their platform appeals to the It gives organized labor a large part in the future French State, with self-chosen representatives. The group is studying a plan for a new constitution patterned on that of the United States. They want none of the Third Republic, and laugh when reminded by the parliamentarian "has-beens" of Algiers that PRESIDENT LE BRUN is still President of France.

The major criticism Resistance Groups in France level at Algiers is that too much time is given to minor political debates among representatives of a defunct Parliament.

People inside France will believe in the French Army only when it has proven victorious in battle in continental Europe.

Great disappointment has been felt over the part played by French troops in Italy. Many Resistance -- Pers regret this attitude

towards the army, pointing to the equally slow progress of Anglo-American Armies in Italy. All end on the note that only the Russians have proved their military value.

The rank and file members of the resistance organizations are recruited from the peasant and worker masses.

The peasantry is anti-German but non-suffering. Their position is guided by material considerations. They have, however, proved helpful to resistance groups. (The Maquis survive due to their support.) They fear post-war political disorders and want a strong government to maintain order. They have an affectionate regard for PETAIN as a fatherly leader who has tried to save France by minor tricks and opposition tactics after the Army's collapse. This support is only sentimental.

The workers have suffered most under occupation. They oppose both Germany and Vichy. Food and necessities are lacking in the cities. Suffering is great. If internal disorder is to be avoided, food should be on hand for distribution to the working classes in the cities when the Germans are defeated. Delphi is certain that if this is not done, there will be a Communist uprising and a resultant reign of terror. The worker thinks and speaks only of the acquate food and normal living conditions the Americans alone can bring. It is important that we not fail them. Although there are few militant Communists and almost no Communist

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leaders, there is among workers and peasants a latent sympathy for Communism, in theory and as applied to the other fellow, and this is enhanced by Russian military success.

The workers want government reform with properly organized trade unions a part of the governing authority. This demand is second only to adequate wage levels. They have urged such of their number as reach safety to plead with Algiers, London and Washington for food for the cities if order is to be maintained.

A serious internal problem is German demoralization of civilians in the north and east. In Alsace the children have been taught only Nazi tenets. Girls have been encouraged to accept German advances to the point that a whole new generation of Germans is being born and it is rare to see a girl or woman over 14 who is not with child. The more determined elements of the resistance movements come from Alsace and Loraine. They operate in central France in preparation for their return to their homeland.

Summary

France overwhelmingly wants DE GAULLE. He has promised on his return to surround himself with a truly French government representative of those who stayed in France and resisted the invader. Parliament has lost its prestige and won't regain it. The French do not want a return of the Third Republic. A French Army must land in France, and the resistance groups must be assured


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they are not being asked to risk their lives without being integrated in the general strategy of the invasion. They want concrete acts, not propaganda. The first step must be to give them arms.

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SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT FROM ARGUS TO REGIS ON CONVERSATION WITH FREECH RESISTANCE LEADER

In further conversation with Delphi, he made two further points:

One is that the reign of terror is gaining momentum. The unspeakable tortures used against members of the Resistance Groups and their families, where even women and children are subjected to the most fiendish cruelties, have provoked the anger of the French people. Savagery is re-appearing everywhere, and there is an iron determination on the part of these people to fight against their oppressors. The French "Milice" from Haute-Savoi indicates that the Germans and the "Milice" are now executing patriots without trial.

The other point of interest is the constant collaboration of the French movement known as "Compagnons de France" with the Resistance Groups. This organization, which had the blessing of Vichy, was long used as a cloak for obtaining supplies and equipment for the Resistance Movement but was abolished early in January. Its members and leaders have in many instances joined the Resistance Underground.



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P.S.F. Safe O. S. S. Joenie

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C.



30 March 1944

Miss Grace Tully, The White House.

Dear Grace:

Attached is a memorandum to the President regarding the extent of Irish cooperation with this office. Will you please hand this to him. Thank you.

William . Donovan

Director

Attachment

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C.

30 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following memorandum will set forth the extent of Irish cooperation with this office. I thought you might want to have it in view of the present situation.

I

"Early in 1943 the Office of Strategic Services' representative in Eire and Mr. David Gray, American Minister to

that the

Irish were willing to cooperate with the United States Government in intelligence matters. Mr. Gray did not want to be directly concerned but approved the establishment of liaison by the OSS.


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"In March 1943 conversations were held in Dublin

at various times and in

various combinations.

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"As a result of these conferences, the OSS representative in Dublin was from time to time subsequently furnished with information requested or volunteered. Since, at the American Minister's request, the representative soon moved his base to London, some of the information he received was sent

given him either before he left, or on subsequent liaison trips to Dublin. Information received included the following subjects among others:

German agents in Ireland, their training, instructions, equipment (including radio equipment) and ciphers; radio activities, illicit radios, interception, and direction finding; the Irish Republican Army; complete lists of Axis nationals, persons of Axis origin, and Axis sympathizers in Eire, their jobs and where possible their views and activities; Axis diplomatic and Consular representatives and their known contacts; map of the Coast Watching System; reports on shipping activities; Axis propaganda; submarine activity off the Irish coast to the extent known; Irish prisoners of war in Germany and known activities of Irishmen in Germany; political groups in Ireland with Fascist leanings or ideologies; interviews with persons who had recently left the Continent including the Irishmen recently parachuted by the Germans into Ireland;

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lists of German aviators interned; lists of and interviews with survivors of a naval action off the Bay of Biscay picked up by an Irish ship.

"As a result of further conversations in Dublin last fall,

So far the information contained in these reports has been of use primarily as confirmation of information from other sources. However, the potentialities are important.

"The cooperation in intelligence matters offered and given by the Irish has been very full. It should be pointed out that we did not offer the Irish information in return and have given them little.

After the recent

parachuting by the Germans of two Irishmen into Eire, but before the delivery of the American note, the Irish alerted the Army, Defense Forces, and the Coast Watching Service.

VI

"Since the delivery of the American note, the Irish have

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offered their prompt cooperation in adopting whatever security measures may be recommended by us

. The American Minister has been informed and has given his approval of our making the recommendations. The Commanding Officer of OSS London is now working on this matter

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SAFE FILE: Offices of Strategic Services: April 1944-45

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C.

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3 April 1944

Miss Grace Tully, The Phits House, Pashington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I should be grateful it you would . . . hand the attached to the President for me.

Sincerely,

Million J. Bonovan, Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

3 April 19/4

KEIDRANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

. I have just received the following cable relating to conditions in Berlin.


"Today Z April 1947, through the assistance of a close mutual friend, we had one hour alone with the Persian Minister to Sweden who was going back to Takerun by way of Baghdad. In order that he be allowed to winit his wife's grave in a suburb of Barlin, a diplomatic permit was obtained for him by Stockholm which allowed him to spend a single day in the German capital. He spent Tuesday Z3 March 1947 in Berlin. The following juict and convincing eye-witness account of his visit was given today after our repeated oaths to maintain accrecy: With the exception of Schlesischer Bahnhof which is unscathed up to this time, all the major railroad stations in Darlin have been completely demolished. All the rail trailie.


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




scened to be running on a synctual schedule and our informant's train was on time at every stop. Incre there are no stations, rail tickets must be procured from the police and only emergency cases and special pass holders are permitted to buy tickets. The appearance of the rolling stock was clean and in good shape. 30th Charlottonburg and Templehof are entirely devolished, without a single building left standing. 50% of the buildings on Onter den Linden are intact and the other 50% destroyed. Both the Legation Cuarter and the Tiergarten are completely demolished. The Luftfahr Ministry and Gestago Headquarters are entirely destroyed. Not a wall is standing at the airport which is a shambles. The Losbit Criminal Courts are demolished. Informant claims he drove in a cab through central and west berlin for a distance of 6 miles without observing a single house standing. Only about 25% of the subway system is in use; the remainder has been converted into giant shelters and a transacous machine repair shop. In the major portion of the city,









the street cars are running. For the most part, the population of Berlin is living underground. They have evacusted all of the small children. The older children and the women are working on a 16 hour a day schedule. All food is stringently rationed, however, on a generous basis sufficient for the basic requirements. Positively no item can be had which is not rationed. This applies equally to clothing. The essential business of perlin proceeds to function doggedly, however, some of the Ministries, the Luftfahr included, have moved to Vienna. Tremendous slave labor forces, for the most part made up of Russians and Poles, are in evidence everywhere doing safety demolition and cleanup. These men are forced to stay out in the open during raids since there are not enough shelters available for everyone in Berlin. During a single raid in March, it is reported that 40,000 of these Poles and Aussians were killed. Our informant reports that a relatively accurate and gloomy picture is being given to the general populace about all the Theaters of Lar including the Lastern Front defeats. This results in a fabulous feur of the Bussians


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but a reaction of intorication, almost as though they were under the influence of morphine, with no sign of collapse and yet a general despair of ever gaining the victory now. Everyone is convinced that the only hope is to fight to the end and there is a glimmer of hope that England and America may, in self interest, turn against Euscia once they see that the boviet is about to assume complete control. In this way, the German cause will be rescued. The Minister passed through Bucharest which did not seem, from the train, to be damaged; he also went through Sofia which he ac roximates is 25% destroyed. However, he was not allowed to speak or see anyone in Rumania."

William J. Donovan Director





OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, D. C.

4 May 1944

Miss Grace Tully, The White House, Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Would you please see that the attached memorandum is placed before the President?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan,

Director.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

By AR Date DEC

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DECLERA

SAFE FILE: Outline Plans for Specific Operations: Book IV

III. PACIFIC - FAR EAST AREA

(1)	JCS 287/1 - Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan	TAB	(L)
(2)	JIC 80/1 - Japanese Strategy in 1943 (2nd Dr)	TAB	(M)
(3)	JCS 297 - Operations in Burma 1943-44	TAB	(M-1)
(4)	CCS 198/1 - Status of "ANAKIM"	TAB	(N)

BOOKS III and IV

OUTLINE PLANS FOR SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IV.

(4) CCS 198/1 - Status of "ANAKIM"

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- 2 -

(BOOK IV)

SUMATRA

COPY NO. 40

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

378-1 (J.C.S. 306)

15 May 1943

Pages 1 - 13 incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS IN SUMATRA

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan was prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee and is circulated for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

DECLATSHEED JCS Hend, 1-4-74 By REP, RER, Date

FEB 1 9 1974

OPERATIONS IN SUMATRA


Report by Joint War Plans Committee

- 1. A study to determine the merits and possibilities of operations against all or part of SUMATRA is contained in Enclosure "A".
- 2. In view of physical limitations and enemy capabilities, it was concluded that the seizure and occupation of north SUMATRA offers the greatest chance of success.
- 3. Concept of the operation (See chart, Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A").
 - a. A landing on the north coast of SUMATRA in the vicinity of LHOKSEUMAWE by amphibious forces under cover of carrier-based aircraft, for the purpose of establishing beachheads and securing the airfield in the vicinity. Simultaneously, a landing on WE Island (SEBANG) for the purpose of securing the harbor and airfield.
 - b. An extension of the bridgehead followed by an advance to the south to seize and hold the line NATAL - KOTAPINANG BAROE - LABOEHANBILIK.
 - 4. Major forces required.
 - a. Ground.
 - 3 Infantry Brigades, 2 Infantry Divisions, 2 Tank Regiments.
 - b. Air.
 - 4 Fighter Groups, 5 Bomber Groups, 1 Observation Group, 1 Transport Group.
 - c. Naval.
 - 4 BB, 9 CV, 4 CA, 8 CL, 75 DD.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, 1



The inherent weakness of this operation lies in the ability of the enemy to concentrate land-based aircraft against our amphibious task forces, and our own inability to provide any land-based air coverage therefor. Thus, during the assault and until landing fields can be made useable, air protection for our forces must be provided by carrier-based aircraft.

6. Strategic significance.


a. The capture of north SUMATRA would interfere with Japanese shipping in the STRAIT OF MALACCA. Air operations may be conducted against PALEMBANG oil refineries and other strategic targets (See Appendix "A").

b. The recapture of north SUMATRA is an essential part of operations to reopen the STRAIT OF MALACCA. The latter is a vital part of the strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN. The opening of the Strait, however, comes in a phase subsequent to the recapture of BURMA and the opening of the BURMA ROAD. It is, therefore, not a substitute for ANAKIM.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 1 9 1974



ENCLOSURE "A"

OPERATIONS IN SUMATRA


1. Problem.

To determine the merits and possibilities of operations against all or part of SUMATRA.

2. General.

- a. SUMATRA is one of the bastions in the outer ring of JAPAN'S defenses. Its occupation, together with MALAYA, insures the control of the STRAIT OF MALACCA and protection to her shipping lanes from the Malay barrier to the SOUTH CHINA SEA. The island is an important source of petroleum and rubber for the support of JAPAN'S war economy. In 1940 SUMATRA produced 39,800,000 barrels of petroleum and 400,000 tons of rubber. Of this amount 7,500,000 barrels of petroleum and 200,000 tons of rubber were produced in northern SUMATRA.
- b. A study of the physical characteristics of the island and the enemy capabilities in the area indicates that the northern part of the island is the most favorable for initial landings and occupation.
- c. The poor communications between north and central SUMATRA makes the enemy reenforcement of ground defenses difficult.
- d. The northern tip of SUMATRA lies some 300 miles west of the MALAY PENINSULA, thereby reducing to some extent the effectiveness of enemy air power against landings along the northern coast.
- <u>é.</u> The capture of north SUMATRA would eventually be followed by the seizure of MALAYA and the capture of SINGAPORE to reopen the STRAIT OF MALACCA. Such an operation is in accordance with the strategic concept for the defeat of JAPAN.

FEB 1 9 1974



3. Geographical estimate.

a. SUMATRA

The island is about 1,000 miles long by 250 miles wide. A backbone of mountains extends down the west coast from end to end. The eastern lowlands, 100 to 200 miles wide, are primarily swampy.

The island is divided into three distinct sections by weather, native types, and communications -- the northern part extending south to NATAL, the central part from NATAL to below DJAMBI, and the southern part from below DJAMBI to SUNDA STRAIT.

SUMATRA has predominantly rugged or swampy terrain.

The west coast mountain spine places all important communications on the east coast. A communications bottleneck effectively separates northern from central and southern SUMATRA.

b. North SUMATRA.

North SUMATRA is roughly 400 miles long and 125 miles wide. MEDAN, population 75,000, is the only city of consequence. The distance across the STRAIT OF MALACCA from north SUMATRA to the MALAY PENINSULA varies from 80 to 200 miles. The limited plains between the swamps along the coast and the forest covered mountain chain are the only areas suitable for cross-country operation of motor transport. Elsewhere traffic is limited to roads or navigable streams. Motor transport is not possible off the prepared roadbeds which follow the natural levees of the river. The climate is wet and tropical. Weather is most favorable in February and March. Malaria is prevalent.

c. Beaches.

Accurate information on beaches is not available.

The best beach in the area is reported to be on the north coast at LHOKSEUMAWE, where 20 miles of hard surfaced beach is backed by roads and a railroad, and fronted by a good anchorage in a protected bay. In addition, there is reported

591 NC

to be a suitable stretch of about 40 miles west of the LHOKSEUMAWE area. No landing beaches with suitable exits to the interior exist along the east coast.

d. Sea approaches.

The hydrography of the area along the north coast will not present undue difficulties to landing operations. The west coast has numerous reefs and shoals; the east coast, in general, has too gradual a slope to permit the near approach of large vessels.

4. Mission.

To seize and hold north SUMATRA.

- 5. Concept of operations (See Appendix "B")
- a. To assault beaches along the north coast of SUMATRA in the vicinity of LHOKSEUMAWE with amphibious forces under cover of carrier-based aircraft, for the purpose of establishing beachheads and securing the airfield nearby. Simultaneously, to assault WE Island in order to secure the harbor and airfield thereon.

b. Assault phase.

- (1) Two brigades land simultaneously on beach areas west of LHOKSEUMAWE.
 - (a) One brigade (A)* captures the nearby airport and establishes a bridgehead through which the light infantry division (D)* can pass.
 - (b) The second brigade (E)* moves west on the KOETARADJA road to contain any Japanese forces in that area.
- (2) A third brigade, (C)* assaults the beach area on WE Island to capture the harbor of SABANG and the airfield nearby.

*See Chart, Appendix "B".

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JCS memo, 1-A-GA By RHP, NLR, (3) A combat-loaded light infantry division (D)*
forming the floating reserve, lands at the bridgehead
secured by the first brigade; proceeds as rapidly as
possible to MEDAN to capture the city, its airdrome, and
the nearby port of BELAWAN.

c. Follow-up phase.

- (1) A light infantry division (E)* convoy-loaded, lands at BELAWAN, if the port is available, otherwise on the north of WE Island in the vicinity of SEBANG. After debarkation it proceeds to MEDAN to reinforce the first light infantry division (D)*.
- (2) Brigade (B)* captures KOETARADJA and the nearby airfield and clears Japanese resistance on the northern and northeastern coasts, thus releasing Brigade (A)* to act as a general reserve for further offensive operations in the south.
- (3) Light infantry division (D)* reinforced by light infantry division (E)* advances south and southeast to establish and defend the line NATAL KOTAPINANG BAROE LABOEHANBILIK.

5. Military estimate - enemy forces.

a. Ground.

It is estimated that one infantry division plus supporting troops (a total of 20,000 men) is in SUMATRA. One regimental combat team garrisons the northern section and is probably centered at MEDAN, with detachments in the vicinity of SABANG, (WE Island -KOETARADJA).

*See Chart, Appendix "B".

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By RHP, N



b. Air.

It is estimated that JAPAN has the following aircraft in the area, MALAYA - SUMATRA - JAVA - ANDAMANS:

36 Fighters

57 Bombers

24 Observation

25 Float fighters

Total 143

c. Naval.

It is estimated that JAPAN has the following vessels based on MALAYA and JAVA:

d. General.

No enemy combat forces are believed to be present in the NICOBARS or on the islands off the west coast of SUMATRA.

No naval or air forces are believed to be in the ANDAMAN ISLANDS.

7. Capability of reinforcement.

a. Ground.

Reinforcements could be transported rapidly from SINGAPORE, JAVA, or by small native boats, from the MALAY PENINSULA. There is now one division (plus) in MALAYA and two in JAVA. In one month, JAPAN could reinforce SUMATRA with troops from INDO-CHINA, CHINA, or THAILAND.

Due to the capacity of port installations and the nature of the terrain, it is estimated that not more than five divisions could be profitably utilized on the island of SUMATRA.

Within 10 days the forces in north SUMATRA could be reinforced by one division from JAVA and one brigade from INDO-CHINA. Immediate reinforcement overland from central

and southern SUMATRA is possible, but unlikely because of the requirements of local security and the great distances involved.

b. Air.

It is estimated that JAPAN can reinforce the area with aircraft as follows:

In 10 days -- 291 aircraft, making the total in the /area 434.

In 14 days -- 168 aircraft making the total in the area 502.

A strength of at least 400 could be maintained indefinitely in this area provided JAPAN is not faced with a major demand in other areas.

o. Naval.

Small Japanese naval forces are available in adjacent areas for reinforcement. Since naval operations in the PACIFIC may be expected to force JAPAN to retain her major naval units there, her most likely action would be to send a task force into the INDIAN OCEAN.

8. Estimate of forces required.

(Since SUMATRA is in an area of British strategic responsibility the operation should be accomplished by British Commonwealth forces. The plan envisages mounting the operation from CEYLON and INDIA).

a. Ground.

(1) Assault forces:

One Infantry Division (Equivalent of 3. Brigades)	17,000
One Light Infantry Division	10,000
Two Armed Regiments	1 000

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FEB 1 9 1974

(2) Follow-up force:

One Light Infantry Division

10,000

(3) Supporting troops:

Estimated at approximately 30% of strength

of other combat units

11,000

49,000

b. Air.

The following, or equivalents in British squadrons, are the air forces necessary to be allocated for the entire operation:

	2	į., 1	Personnel
14	Fighter Groups		4,892
1	Light Bomber Group		1,247
2	Medium Bomber Groups		3,112
2	Heavy Bomber Groups		3,338
1	Observation Group ,		882
1	Transport Carrier Group		1,452
S	upporting units	41	7,283
	Total air personnel		22,216
	Total aircraft	1	700

c. Naval.

	Covering f	orce	Escort	and assa	ult
BB	14				
CV	3		. 6		4 5
CA	4		`. · .	22	
CT .			8		
DD	27		48		

Plus minesweepers, etc.

9. Critical factors affecting success of operation.

a. Air.

JAPAN now has 11 landing fields and 5 airdromes within 350 miles of the initial area of operations. There are 3

landing fields and no airdromes within the area selected for the initial assault. The condition and capacity of the landing fields is unknown. It must be assumed that JAPAN has adequate facilities for operating all aircraft that she can make available in this area.

JAPAN'S capabilities to reinforce with aircraft will vary to a great extent, depending on the state of her air force and the state of activity in other areas.

Carriers must remain in the area until landing fields ashore have been seized and placed in operation. In the absence of more definite information, it is logical to assume that the three landing fields in the area, even though seized intact, would not accommodate a large number of airplanes. One fighter squadron and one bomber squadron each should be considered a reasonable estimate. This situation will require that some aircraft carriers remain in the area until landing fields can be built or enlarged. This would require 2 weeks to 2 months depending on the terrain and construction equipment available.

b. Naval.

Since no support from shore based aircraft will be available until airfields can be secured and made useable, the requirements for carrier based aircraft will be heavy. The use of ACV's in an assault operation is undesirable, but in view of the shortage of carriers some may have to be employed.

Due to losses during aerial reconnaissance and other operations prior to the actual landing, a superiority of three to one must be provided in order to insure a superiority of two to one at the beachhead.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR

Due to lack of port facilities during the assault phase, the supply of the operations during this period should be facilitated by the provision of small coastal vessels and sea-going landing craft. Small vessels will also be required to supply the forces as they advance southward from the initial landing areas.

Advantages and disadvantages.

a. Advantages.

The establishment of UNITED NATIONS forces on the Island of SUMATRA would have the following advantages:

- (1) Opens another front for the employment of UNITED NATIONS forces against JAPAN.
- (2) Provides bases for air and submarines to operate against Japanese forces using the STRAIT OF MALACCA.
- (3) Forces JAPAN to further disperse her ground, sea, and air forces and bring them within range of our attack.
- (4) Furnishes a fertile field for attrition against Japanese air and naval forces, and shipping.
- (5) Facilitates further UNITED NATIONS operations down the MALAY PENINSULA to SINGAPORE.
- (6) Provides an air transport stop permitting the establishment of an air route between AUSTRALIA and INDIA. It would complete the last link in our air transport and ferry route around the world.
- (7) Would deny to JAPAN and make available to the UNITED NATIONS appreciable amounts of rubber and oil. b. Disadvantages.
- (1) The operation cannot be supported initially by land-based aviation and is therefore likely to be very costly in shipping.

- (2) These operations may require the eventual occupation of the entire island and the MALAY PENINSULA. They may involve unusually heavy garrisoning of the occupied areas to insure maintaining our position, with consequent increased demands on shipping.
- (3) The maintenance of the sea line of communications would require increased demands for escort vessels.
- (4) As long as the enemy occupies the MALAY PENINSULA, its land based aircraft exposes UNITED NATIONS convoys to air attack.


11. Seizure of northern SUMATRA versus ANAKIM.

- a. Our strategic concept for the defeat of JAPAN requires opening a supply route to CHINA and is based on keeping CHINA in the war. This supply route must be opened as quickly as possible, and an operation to open the Burma Road is the only operation which will accomplish this in any reasonable time. The accomplishment of ANAKIM is urgent.
- <u>b.</u> Although a campaign to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA is also an essential part of our strategic plan, the opening of this Strait is <u>not</u> urgent. Furthermore, the capture of north SUMATRA is not the first step in opening the STRAIT OF MALACCA. The first step is the reconquest of BURMA.
- c. UNITED NATIONS forces in the FAR EAST are not sufficient to mount ANAKIM and recapture north SUMATRA simultaneously. Furthermore, the urgency of ANAKIM will not permit its delay until the fall of 1944. This would be the earliest date that it could be mounted, if the north SUMATRA operation is initiated first. The recapture of north SUMATRA has many strategic advantages, but under the present concept for the defeat of JAPAN, it is not a matter of urgency. Its advantages may be reaped after the conquest of BURMA.

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
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- a. The results that may be expected from the seizure of north SUMATRA when compared to those which may be obtained by a successful ANAKIM makes the north SUMATRA operation unacceptable as a substitute for ANAKIM.
- b. Considering the relation of the north SUMATRA operation to other operations to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA the sequence should be
 - (1) Reconquest of BURMA
 - (2) Advance down MALAY PENINSULA to capture SINGAPORE with forces based in southern BURMA.
 - (3) Recapture of northern SUMATRA closely coordinated with (2) above.
- c. The inherent weakness of this operation lies in the ability of the enemy to concentrate land based aircraft against our forces during the assault. It is therefore essential that the operation be coordinated with naval and air offensive operations in the PACIFIC and ASIATIC theatres which would prevent the transfer of enemy air forces to the SUMATRA area.

JCS memo, 1-4-74 By RHP, NLR, Date


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


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
JCS memo, 1-4-74 By RHP, NLR, Date

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


DECLASSIFIED JCS memo, 1-4-74 By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 1 9 1974



Air field Airdrome Seaplane Anchorage Submarine Cable

● 000, Port and Port Capacity (DWT/Day)







SUBSEQUENT TO DODECANESE SUBSEQUENT TO DODECANESE

- SFCURITY

COPY NO. 42

375-1 (J.C.S. 310)

14 May 1943

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE SEIZURE OF THE DODECANESE

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE.

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat

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Joint Secretariat

BRIEF

OF

OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE SEIZURE OF THE DODECANESE

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

- 1. A study of the merits and possibilities of operations against other AEGEAN ISLANDS subsequent to the seizure and occupation of the DODECANESE, in order to open a sea route to SMYRNA and to improve the UNITED NATIONS position in the AEGEAN, is contained in Enclosure "A."
 - 2. Operation to open a sea route to SMYRNA. (See Chart, Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A")
 - a. Concept.

An amphibious assault, against IKARIA, KHIOS, and MYTILENE, launched from bases in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN.

Phase I. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority northward from the DODECANESE over IKARIA and KHIOS.

Phase II. Amphibious and airborne landing operations to seize and occupy IKARIA and KHIOS.

Phase III. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over MYTILENE.

Phase IV. Amphibious and airborne operations to seize and occupy MYTILENE.

- b. UNITED NATIONS forces required.
 - (1) Air. 1559 aircraft.
 798 bombers, 525 fighters, 208 troop carriers, 28
 miscellaneous aircraft.
 - (2) Ground.
 - l infantry division, l regimental combat team,
 - l parachute regiment, l parachute battalion.

- 1 -

(3) Naval.

Covering force (IONIAN SEA): 4BB, 2CV, 8 CA and CL, 20 DD.

DECLASS

JCS memo,] By RHP, NLE

By. RHP, NLF

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BRIEF

OF

OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE SEIZURE OF THE DODECANESE

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

- 1. A study of the merits and possibilities of operations against other AEGEAN ISLANDS subsequent to the seizure and occupation of the DODECANESE, in order to open a sea route to SMYRNA and to improve the UNITED NATIONS position in the AEGEAN, is contained in Enclosure "A."
 - 2. Operation to open a sea route to SMYRNA. (See Chart, Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A")
 - a. Concept.

An amphibious assault, against IKARIA, KHIOS, and MYTILENE, launched from bases in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN.

Phase I. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority northward from the DODECANESE over IKARIA and KHIOS.

Phase II. Amphibious and airborne landing operations to seize and occupy IKARIA and KHIOS.

Phase III. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over MYTILENE.

Phase IV. Amphibious and airborne operations to seize and occupy MYTILENE.

- b. UNITED NATIONS forces required.
 - (1) Air. 1559 aircraft.
 798 bombers, 525 fighters, 208 troop carriers, 28
 miscellaneous aircraft.
 - (2) Ground.
 - l infantry division, l regimental combat team,
 - l parachute regiment, l parachute battalion.

- 1 -

(3) Naval.

Covering force (IONIAN SEA): 4BB, 2CV, 8 CA and CL, 20 DD.

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Assault force: 2 HQS, 18 DD, 24 PC, 20 APA, 7AKA, smaller craft as required.

3. Operation to improve the UNITED NATIONS position in the AEGEAN. (See Chart, Appendix "B" to Enclosure "A")

a. Concept.

An amphibious and airborne operation launched from bases in the DODECANESE to seize and occupy the islands of NAXOS, PAROS, and MELOS.

Phase I. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over NAXOS and PAROS.

Phase II. Amphibious and airborne landing operations to seize and occupy the islands of NAXOS and PAROS.

Phase III. The occupation of MELOS.

b. UNITED NATIONS forces required.

- (1) Air.
 - 1559 aircraft, as for the operations to open a sea route to SMYRNA. (Paragraph 1).
- (2) Ground.

2 regimental combat teams, 1 parachute battalion.

(3) Naval.

Covering force (IONIAN SEA): 4 BB, 2 CV, 8 CA and CL, 20 DD.

Assault force: 18 DD, 24 PC and SC, landing craft and smaller craft as required.

4. Conclusions.

a. One of the main objects of operations in the AEGEAN would be to persuade TURKEY to enter the war as an active ally. If this has not been accomplished by the capture of the DODECANESE, it is unlikely that further operations against the AEGEAN islands will cause TURKEY to abandon her neutral position.

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Assault force: 2 HQS, 18 DD, 24 PC, 20 APA, 7AKA, smaller craft as required.

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Phase I. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over NAXOS and PAROS.

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Assault force: 18 DD, 24 PC and SC, landing craft and smaller craft as required.

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Phase III. The occupation of MELOS.

b. UNITED NATIONS forces required.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE SEIZURE OF THE DODECANESE

Assumptions.

- a. HUSKY was successfully completed by mid-August, 1943.
- b. ITALY has not collapsed.
- c. The bomber offensive against AXIS installations on the continent is increasing in intensity and will seriously reduce the AXIS war potential.
- d. GERMANY's operations against RUSSIA in 1943 will not be decisive, and RUSSIA will remain an important factor in the war.
- e. An invasion of the BRITISH ISLES or of TURKEY is not considered an AXIS capability. An AXIS invasion of the IBERIAN PENINSULA is improbable. SPAIN, PORTUGAL, and TURKEY remain neutral.
- <u>f</u>. The Battle of the ATLANTIC remains serious in its shipping implications.
- g. UNITED NATIONS commitments in the PACIFIC and Asiatic areas and to RUSSIA remain substantially as now planned.
- h. The DODECANESE islands and the Greek island of SAMOS are in the hands of the UNITED NATIONS forces.

2. General discussion.

a. Terrain estimate.

- (1) The islands in the AEGEAN are mainly the tops of mountains projecting above the surface of the sea.

 MELOS, PAROS, NAXOS, ANDROS, LEMNOS, MYTILENE, KHIOS, and IKARIA are among the few known to contain areas suitable for the construction of fighter strips or airdromes.
- (2) It is known that the enemy has airdromes on MYTILENE and LEMNOS. Fighter strips and emergency landing fields have been put in on almost all of the larger islands throughout the AEGEAN. There are in

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addition several large seaplane bases. These islands are generally of limestone formation so that the ground dries rapidly after even a heavy shower, and fighter strips are usable within a short time.

- (3) Lending beaches on the islands throughout
 the AEGEAN are generally limited in extent making
 it difficult to mount a large assault against the
 majority of the islands. It becomes advisable
 therefore that combined amphibious and airborne
 assaults be made upon whatever islands it is intended
 to seize.
- (4) The climate is Mediterranean and is characterized by mild, intermittently rainy winters and hot, dry summers. During the winter there may be occasional winds of sufficient strength to create heavy sees; these winds are generally from the north.

 b. Enemy capabilities.

(1) Air.

It was estimated that the AXIS could, by reductions in other areas, reinforce the 333 planes in the area by 1300 of all types to oppose UNITED NATIONS operations in the DODECANESE. If operations are conducted in the AEGEAN by the UNITED NATIONS subsequent to the seizure of the DODECANESE, it is assumed that the AXIS can maintain this air strength by replacement of losses.

The known and possible airdromes in GREECE, CRETE, and the AEGEAN islands will support any force the AXIS can deploy. The size of the force that will actually be employed will depend upon the importance the AXIS attaches to this area.

(2) Ground.

The Germans are reported to have one reserve infantry division and miscellaneous non-divisional

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units in the PELOPONNESUS and the Greek Islands. There are reported to be about 3500 Germans on MYTILENE, 800 on LEMNOS, and 500 on KHIOS. These units are principally anti-aircraft and internal security troops. The Germans have on CRETE from 20,000 to 50,000 men. The Italians have 40,000 men in the Greek Islands, including CRETE, and eight infantry divisions on the Greek mainland. As of this date (12 May 1943) the Italian garrisons in the AECEAN islands are estimated as follows:

300 men	THERA
800	NAXOS
800	PAROS
3,000	SYROS
600	ANDROS

It is probable that some of these smaller garrisons will be concentrated in the larger AEGEAN islands, CRETE, and the PELOPONNESUS upon the fall of the DODECANESE.

Although the AXIS would probably defend CRETE strongly, a stubborn defense is not expected throughout the rest of the islands. At the present time it is considered improbable that the AXIS will substantially reinforce the ground forces in the area.

(3) Naval.

It can be expected that miscellaneous local defense craft and submarines will be encountered.

c. Political and economic factors.

The Greek Islands are under Military rule. An invading force can expect aid from the population.

The islands are barely able to sustain their normal population. Any UNITED NATIONS invading force must be prepared to carry all of its supplies with it.

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The islands are barely able to sustain their normal population. Any UNITED NATIONS invading force must be prepared to carry all of its supplies with it.

On the larger islands there are ordinarily sufficient springs and wells to furnish the necessary water. Water on the smaller islands is extremely scarce during the summer drought.

3. a. Air - general.

The proximity of islands with existing airdromes or terrain suitable for the construction of fighter strips makes the maintenance of fighter cover by the UNITED NATIONS throughout the operation a fairly easy task. This is true in an advance either north or west from our present position in the DODECANESE.

b. Naval - general.

With air bases on IKARIA, KHIOS, and MYTILENE the Port of SMYRNA will be open to UNITED NATIONS shipping. This shipping should be routed from the east to the northward of RHODES, and eastward of KOS, SAMOS, KHIOS, and thence through the GULF OF SMYRNA.

With the above localities in the hands of the UNITED NATIONS it would be feasible to operate destroyers and smaller naval craft within range of shore; based aircraft in daylight and would be further possible to make sweeps through the AEGEAN SEA during the hours of darkness.

- 4. Discussion of operations to open a sea route to SMYRNA.

 a. Examination of possible operations.
 - (1) A sea route to SMYRNA may be opened by a further advance northward to occupy the islands of IKARIA, KHIOS, and MYTILENE. With these islands in UNITED NATIONS hands it will be possible to furnish adequate air and naval protection to convoys proceeding into SMYRNA.
 - (2) While a further advance to LEMNOS would make

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 - (2) While a further advance to LEMNOS would make

the route more secure, the cost of such an operation would not be commensurate with the results to be obtained, particularly since the airdromes on the island could be neutralized by UNITED NATIONS bombing operations.

b. Concept of the operation. (See Chart. Appendix "A") An amphibious assault against IKARIA, KHIOS and MYTILENE launched from bases in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN.

Phase I. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority northward from the DODECANESE over IKARIA and KHIOS.

Phase II. Amphibious and airborne landing operations to seize and occupy IKARIA and KHIOS.

Phase III. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over MYTILENE.

Phase IV. Amphibious and airborne operations to seize and occupy MYTILENE.

c. Forces required.

(1) Air.

Bombers (Medium)	10	groups	570	a/c
Bombers (L/D)	4	"	228	a/c
Fighters	7	H.	525	a/c
Troop Carriers	4	n .	208	a/c
Photo Reconnaissance			4	a/c
Observation	1	squadron	24	a/c

Note: (a) It is assumed that 75% of the above aircraft will be operational.

> (b) The aircraft employed in the static defense of the DODECANESE are not included in these figures.

(2) Ground.

(a) To seize and occupy IKARIA and KHIOS, it is estimated that the following forces will be required:

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By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 1 9 1974

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(2) Ground.

(a) To seize and occupy IKARIA and KHIOS, it is estimated that the following forces will be required:

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By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 1 9 1974

One Regimental Combat Team (amphibiously trained)

One Parachute Battalion

(b) To seize and occupy MYTILENE, it is estimated that the following forces will be required:

One Infantry Division (amphibiously trained)
One Parachute Regiment

(3) Naval.

(a) Covering force (IONIAN SEA)

- 4 Battleships
- 2 Aircraft Carriers
- 8 Cruisers
- 20 Destroyers

(b) Assault force.

- 20 APA!s
- 7 AKA's
- 2 Headquarters Ships
- 18 Destroyers
- 24 PC's

Minesweepers, tugs, and miscellaneous craft as required.

d. Advantages.

- (1) Has a beneficial moral effect on TURKEY.
- (2) Acquires further air bases for strategic bombing operations into the BALKANS.
 - (3) Encourages subversive activities in the BALKANS.
- (4) Contains present German air forces in the BALKANS and might cause a limited additional diversion of units from the Russian Front.
- (5) Interdicts the AXIS lines of communication through the AEGEAN.
- (6) Opens the Port of SMYRNA to UNITED NATIONS shipping.

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e. Disadvantages.

- (1) Is a difficult amphibious operation moving directly into strong AXIS air defensive installations.
- (2) Is not suitable as a route of advance into the BALKANS because additional amphibious operations in the face of strong AXIS opposition are a necessary prelude thereto.
- (3) Does not contribute materially to the collapse of ITALY.
- (4) Will not seriously dislocate German strategic plans nor provide any substantial diversion of strength from the Russian Front.
- (5) Is an unjustified diversion of UNITED NATIONS resources if no decisive operations are envisaged in this area.
- (6) Imposes a greater strain on UNITED NATIONS shipping to maintain the position than that imposed by any other operation on the continent.

5. Discussion of operations to improve the UNITED NATIONS position in the AEGEAN.

a. Examination of possible operations.

- (1) The UNITED NATIONS position in the AEGEAN SEA can be improved by advancing westward from the DODECANESE to the island of MELOS. This operation will furnish additional areas from which aircraft can be operated. It will place the UNITED NATIONS forces across the AEGEAN line of supply to CRETE and the BLACK SEA.
- (2) The UNITED NATIONS position in the AEGEAN could also be improved by advancing northward to LEMNOS.

 Occupation of this island would place the UNITED NATIONS across the line of communications through the DARDANELLES.

 Even though the UNITED NATIONS succeeded in occupying LEMNOS, it could at any time be made untenable by AXIS

air action. Possession of LEMNOS would also provide a forward base for air support of an amphibious attack on SALONIKA. Such an attack, however, should not be launched prior to TURKEY's entry into the war, and in that event a land advance from TURKEY in EUROPE is more acceptable. The improvement of the UNITED NATIONS position resulting from an advance northward to LEMNOS would not be commensurate with the cost of the operation.

b. Concept of the operation. (See Chart, Appendix "B")

An amphibious and airborne operation launched from bases in the DODECANESE to seize and occupy the islands of NAXOS, PAROS, and MELOS.

Phase I. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority over NAXOS and PAROS.

Phase II. Amphibious and airborne landing operations to seize and occupy the islands of NAXOS and PAROS.

Phase III. The occupation of MELOS.

c. Forces required.

(1) Air.

Bombers (Medium)	10	groups	570	a/c
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Fighters	7	"	525	a/c
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Photo Reconnaissance			4	a/c
Observation	1	squadro	n 24	a/c

Note: (a) It is assumed that 75% of the above aircraft will be operational.

> (b) The aircraft employed in the static defense of the DODECANESE are not included in these figures.

(2) Ground.

Two Regimental Combat Teams (amphibiously trained)

One Parachute Battalion

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(3) Naval.

(a) Covering force (IONIAN SEA)

- 4 Battleships
- 2 Aircraft Carriers
- 8 Cruisers
- 20 Destroyers

(b) Assault force.

- 35 LST
- 35 LCI(L)
- 35 LCT
- 18 Destroyers
- 24 PC's and SC's

Minesweepers, tugs, and miscellaneous craft as required.


d. Advantages.

- (1) Will interdict AXIS supply routes through the AEGEAN to CRETE and the BLACK SEA.
- (2) Will secure an advanced air base for a possible attack upon PELOPONNESUS and an additional base for an attack on CRETE.

e. Disadvantages.


- (1) May prove a difficult position to seize and occupy and be a very costly air base from which to operate against CRETE and the PELOPONNESUS.
- (2) Is a difficult amphibious operation moving directly into strong AXIS air defensive installations.
- (3) Does not contribute materially to the collapse of ITALY.
- (4) Will not seriously dislocate German strategic plans nor provide any substantial diversion of strength from the Russian Front.
- (5) Is an unjustified diversion of UNITED NATIONS resources if no decisive operations are envisaged in this area.
- (6) Imposes a greater strain on UNITED NATIONS shipping to maintain the position than that imposed by any other operation on the continent.

L.M.T. ahead of G.M.T.



REFERENCE





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1 hr. 40 mins.

1 hr 48 mins L.M.T. ahead of G.M.T.

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1 hr. 48 mins L.M.T. ahead of G.M.T. ARRY MAP SERVICE U S ARRY WASHINGTON D C. 100147

With AIR INFORMATION as supplied

AZORES

COPY NO. 41

381-1 (J.C.S. 319)

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

16 May 1943 Pages 1 - 11 incl

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SEIZURE OR PEACEFUL OCCUPATION OF THE AZORES

Note by the Secretaries

The attached study prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee is circulated for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

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By RT Date MAY 2 1973

SEIZURE OR PEACEFUL OCCUPATION OF THE AZCRES

Report by Joint War Flans Committee

- 1. A study to determine the merits and possibilities of a seizure of the AZCRES either peacefully or by an occupation through force is contained in Enclosure 'A." A brief thereof is set forth below.
- 2. The utilization of air and naval bases in the AZORES will contribute materially to meeting the U-boat threat by providing VLR land-based aircraft cover for the presently uncovered areas of the central North ATLANTIC.
- 3. The AZORES consist of a group of 9 islands. The three most important, SAN MIGUEL, TERCEIRA, and FAYAL, contain the majority of the population of 260,000. Level stretches of land are the exception. Landing beaches are scarce. The islands all have circumferential road systems but movement over the interior in most areas must be on foot.
- 4. There are two artificial harbors, PONTA DELGADA on SAN MIGUEL ISLAND, and HCRTA on FAYAL ISLAND, which accommodate a limited number of vessels. Anchorage, exposed to the seaward, for large vessels can be found at PONTA DELGADA, HORTA, and ANGRA. It is estimated that the addition of the necessary floating maintenance and repair facilities sufficient to support 20 DE's would tax all port capacities to the maximum.
- 5. Two military airfields now exist on the islands, which should be capable of supporting VLR aircraft operations within 15 days of occupation. Additional sites are available for development.
 - 6. Average weather conditions present no bar to the operation of land-based aircraft from the AZORES.
 - 7. Portuguese armed forces in the AZORES are the best of the nation, but are lightly armed and equipped with obsolete aircraft.

 It is felt that their resistance to a well-balanced aggressive

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force would be ineffective. They consist of:

Ground:

25,700 troops.

Air:

41 obsolete aircraft.

Naval:

2 DD's.

8. A peaceful utilization of the AZORES as an air and naval base would be preferable to an occupation by force. If peaceful negotiations should fail, preparations must be complete for an immediate occupation by force.

- 9. SPAIN'S reaction to either a peaceful or forced occupation of the AZORES would probably be the same, in either case reflecting apprehension for her position in the CANARY ISLANDS and resulting in diplomatic protests.
- 10. AXIS reaction to either a peaceful or forced occupation of the AZORES would probably result in strong blasts of propaganda pointing to our violation of the precepts of the ATLANTIC Char-The likelihood of air attacks on PORTUGAL and attacks on ter. Portuguese shipping would be less if the occupation were forced.
- 11. PORTUGAL'S price for a peaceful entry to the AZORES might consist of requests for additional economic aid, military supplies, and equipment, as well as protection by UNITED NATIONS armed forces. In the event of a forced occupation, she might seek reparation in terms of such aid, supplies, and protection. No full break with the UNITED NATIONS is anticipated.
- 12. It is estimated that the following would be required for an occupation by force:

1 Division, Reinforced (Amphibiously trained).

1 Carrier Group, 36 F and 36 DB. Air:

2 BB, 1 CV, 2 CA or CL, 23 DD, 15 APA, 5 AKA. Naval: This force to effect landings on FAYAL and TERCEIRA ISLANDS simultaneously, and subsequently to reduce SAN MIGUEL ISLAND.

13. The advantages to be obtained in utilizing the AZORES as an air base from which to combat the submarine menace, greatly outweigh the disadvantages which would accure to their occupation.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

SEIZURE OR PEACEFUL OCCUPATION OF THE AZORES

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Anti-submarine campaign.

An important weapon in the anti-submarine campaign is the VLR aircraft. The operation of this type of airplane from presently available bases should become highly effective late in the summer of 1943, and force the U-boat to areas that are out of range of bases now at our disposal. If the AZORES could be used as a base for VLR aircraft, the UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM convoys could be re-routed through areas with more desirable flying weather, thus obtaining improved coverage. The UNITED STATES-NORTH AFRICA, and TRINIDAD-UNITED KINGDOM convoys could also follow routes along which they would receive complete cover. (See Appendix "A"). A considerable time would be required to place the AZORES bases in full operation after they are obtained. Therefore, early action is necessary if these bases are to be used during the critical periods in 1943.

2. Use of AZORES as aircraft ferrying staging point.

The possible use of air base facilities in the AZORES as a staging point for ferrying of long range aircraft to the UNITED KINGDOM, NORTH AFRICA, INDIA, and the FAR EAST should be borne in mind. The following comparative distances are significant:

MIAMI-NATAL-CASABLANCA 7,213 statute miles

NEW YORK-BOTWOOD-AZORES-CASABLANCA 3,881 statute miles

- a saving of 46%.

ESTIMATE

3. General -

a. The AZORES are a group of 9 islands with a distance of about 400 miles between the extreme islands, SANTA MARIA and FLORES. (See Appendix "B"). The largest island of the group is SAN MIGUEL, 40 miles long and 10 miles in width at the widest part. The islands have a population of approximately 260,000, congregated mostly on the only islands of importance in the group, SAN MIGUEL, TERCEIRA, and FAYAL. There are reputed to be more AZOREANS in the UNITED STATES than there are in the AZORES, as a result of which the people of the islands have strong economic and blood ties with their people who have emigrated to this country. However, the military forces in the AZORES come from PORTUGAL, so that bonds of understanding which exist between the people of the UNITED STATES and the AZORES do not extend to the armed forces of the islands.

b. The islands are volcanic in origin. All are rugged and hilly, with deep, narrow valleys. The maximum elevation throughout the islands is 7600 feet. Level stretches of land are the exception rather than the rule. Landing beaches are scarce. Movement over most of the interior of the islands must be on foot, although all of the islands have circumferential road systems capable of handling two-way normal traffic. Most of the roads, due to numerous defiles and a few bridges, could be blocked temporarily. Water is abundant in the coastal areas of the islands except on FAYAL where, during the summer, it is scarce and at all times is sufficient only for the local population. At HORTA is situated the principal cable station of the mid-Atlantic. SAN MIGUEL is served by an indifferent telephone system.

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4. Ports

There are only two all-weather ports in the AZORES, PONTA DELGADA on SAN MIGUEL ISLAND, and HORTA on FAYAL ISLAND. Both are artificial harbors, accommodating a limited number of vessels. Anchorage for large vessels at PONTA DELGADA, HORTA, and ANGRA is ample in size for all practicable purposes, but exposed to seaward. Total cargo capacity of all ports is about 1750 tons daily, mostly by lighter. Existing repair facilities are based entirely on local needs. It is estimated that no operating naval vessels of DE size or larger could base on the AZORES without adding to existing maintenance and repair facilities, and that the addition of floating maintenance and repair facilities sufficient to support 20 DE's would tax all port capacities to the maximum.

5. Airfields

a. An analysis of suitable air field sites follows:

Island	FAYAL	TERCEIRA	SAN MIGUEL	SAN MARIA
Location	FETEIRAS	LAGENS	SANTA ANA (RABO de PEIXE)	AREIAS
Status	Projected	Operational	Operational	Projected
Class	Emergency	Military	Military	Military

Runways

NW-SE:6000'x600'

NNW-SSE:4800'x400' NW-SE:4900'x300'

WNW-ESE:4500'x250' E-W:3900'x300'

NW-SE:3900'x300' NE-SW: 3700'x300'

NNE-SSW:2500'x210' N-S:2800'x300'

MME-BBM.E.JOO REIO M-B.EGGO RJOO

Now suitable for the type indicated B(M),B(C), F,

B(M), B(L), F,

J.C.S. Regrading Memo 12-73

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				17
-21 x 1 x 1	FAYAL	TERCEIRA	SAN MIGUEL	SAN MARIA
Can be made suitable for	Utilities Aircraft	All types (Jnknown	All types
the types in- dicated in the number of days	60 days	30 days		120 days
shown, by the work noted.	Continued grading, construc-	Construction of hard standings,	Some additional construc-	Complete con- struction re- quired. Reputed
	tion of base fa-	taxi ways, additional base facil-	tion prob- ably required.	to be best site in Islands.
	cilities, graveling, metalling	ities and extension	required.	
	or steel matting surface.	and surfac- ing of ex- isting run-		
		ways.		

b. The above analysis indicates that initial operations of VLR aircraft from LAGENS air field in TERCEIRA ISLAND may be expected about 15 days after occupation. One squadron of 12 VLR aircraft can be accommodated initially. Estimated maximum capacity is 3 to 4 squadrons in 90 days with 1/2 fighter squadron. The capacity of SANTA ANA field (RABO de PEIXE) on SAN MIGUEL ISLAND for VLR aircraft is undetermined pending a definite survey of expansion possibilities.

6. Weather

The average temperature varies from 73° F. during the summer to about 58° F. in the winter. Fogs are infrequent, although there is sometimes a haze which reduces visibility. There is much cloudy weather from November to April. During this period the clouds form and persist mostly on the windward side of the islands. There are no indications that any weather conditions, except gales which may be expected occasionally, would interfere with the operation of land-based planes.

7. Enemy forces

a. Ground forces in the AZORES total 25,700, distributed as follows (See Appendix "B"):

- (1) SAN MIGUEL ISLAND 15,900, consisting of 3 infantry regiments, a total of 12,500 men, plus various artillery, engineer, and service units, totaling 3,400 men. Artillery consists of 3-6" coast defense guns, 10 French 75's, 5 120 mm.'s in emplacements, 12-105 mm. howitzers, and 8 Vickers 3.7 in.
- (2) FAYAL ISLAND 4,000 troops, consisting of 1 infantry regiment, 1 artillery regiment, plus engineer and service units. Artillery consists of 2 6" coast defense guns, 4 French 75's, 2 75 mm. field guns, and 4 Vickers 3.7 in.
- (3) TERCEIRA ISLAND 5,800 troops, consisting of 1 infantry and 1 artillery regiment, plus engineer and service units. Artillery consists of 3 French 75's, 4 other field guns, probably 75's, and 6 Vickers 3.7 in.
- b. Aircraft in the AZORES total 41 obsolete planes. On SAN MIGUEL there are 13 Gladiator fighters, 2 Grumman amphibians, and 12 Grumman G44's. on TERCEIRA there are 14 Gladiators.
 - c. Naval forces on the AZORES total 2 destroyers, based.

PEACEFUL OCCUPATION BY NEGOTIATION

- 8. It is preferable to secure the use of the airfields and harbors of the AZORES by negotiation rather than by seizure.

 Nevertheless, all preparations necessary for Military occupation should be complete when negotiations are initiated so that occupation may follow immediately if negotiations fail.
- 9. Granting Portuguese acquiescence to an occupation, it is believed that SPAIN would register a protest and would become apprehensive of her position in the CANARY ISLANDS. Assurances on the part of GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, given simultaneously with the occupation, should assist in countering these fears. It is believed that no overt act on the part of SPAIN need be anticipated. Any negotiations which would involve the employment of UNITED NATIONS forces in PORTUGAL would be unacceptable. DECLASSIFIED

By R Date MAY 21 1973

- 10. The AXIS probably would react by propaganda, devoted to the theme that the Portuguese consent was forced, together with comments on the violation of weaker nations in direct contradiction to the precepts of the ATLANTIC Charter. Reprisals against the Portuguese in the form of bombing raids on PORTUGAL and attacks on shipping are considered to be the maximum measures which the AXIS can take. These are unlikely as they would tend to drive the Portuguese further into the UNITED NATIONS camp. Such reprisals, or their threat would, however, undoubtedly result in demands by PORTUGAL upon the UNITED NATIONS for anti-submarine and anti-aircraft protection and material.
- 11. The garrison required for a peaceful entry of the AZORES should consist of troops to operate the air bases and radar installations plus the necessary airdrome defense battalions. These units would be augmented initially by the construction units.

OCCUPATION BY FORCE

12. General.

- a. The Military occupation of the AZORES, as an alternative to acquiring the desired bases by negotiations, will require that an amphibious force be in readiness for an immediate seizure. This step will require a larger garrison force than would a peaceful entry.
- <u>b</u>. The traditional British friendship and alliance with PORTUGAL might be severed if British forces were employed in the seizure of the AZORES. The UNITED NATIONS will desire to retain certain privileges in PORTUGAL. To insure the retention of diplomatic relations with at least one member of the UNITED NATIONS it would seem desirable for an occupation in force to be made by the UNITED STATES. The use of Brazilian troops with the UNITED STATES forces does not appear sound. The ethnological ties between BRAZIL and PORTUGAL might

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jeopardize the negotiations and the operation; some Brazilians would undoubtedly inform the Portuguese. In view of these considerations, it appears that only UNITED STATES forces should be employed in the seizure of the AZORES.

- c. The Portuguese forces in the AZORES probably would offer only slight resistance, and although PORTUGAL would make strong protests against our action, a break with all the UNITED NATIONS or adherence to the AXIS, is considered unlikely.
- d. The Spanish and AXIS reactions would probably be identical to those which would occur as a result of a peaceful occupation. There would be less likelihood of AXIS reprisals.

13. Concept of the Operation.

a. Simultaneous ship-to-shore landings under carrier-based air cover with naval gun support to be effected on FAYAL and TERCEIRA ISLANDS with objectives as follows (See Appendix "B"):

(1) On FAYAL:

To seize the cable and radio facilities and secure the harbor at HORTA.

(2) On TERCEIRA:

To seize, secure, and place in operation the airfield at LAGENS.

b. Subsequent to the above, to eliminate resistance on and occupy SAN MIGUEL ISLAND, to secure and place in operation the airfield at RABO de PEIXE, and the harbor at PONTA DELGADA.

14. Forces required.

a. It is estimated that the following will be required for an occupation of the AZORES by force:

Ground: 1 Division, Reinforced (amphibiously trained).

Air: 1 Carrier Group, 36 fighters, 36 dive bombers.

Naval: 2 BB, 1 CV, 2 CA or CL, 23 DD, 15 APA, 5 AKA.

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The above force may appear to be excessive but it is felt that such a show of strength will induce the defenders to offer limited resistance only, and that the provision of the force listed will permit occupation with the minimum loss of life and materiel.

b. It is estimated that the force indicated below should be available initially for a garrison:

Ground: 1 Division, Reinforced.

Air: 1 Fighter Squadron.

1 A/S Squadron (VLR).

Navel: 6 173' PC.'s.

Local HD craft as required.

c. After the situation has been clarified, it is believed that the ground force garrison could be reduced to the equivation of a reinforced regimental combat team.

ADVANTAGES

- 15. The UNITED NATIONS will have a base from which enti-submarine air protection can be provided for the remaining portions of the presently unprotected areas of the principal ATLANTIC convey routes.
- 16. The occupation by the UNITED NATIONS will deny the islands to the enemy as possible minor clandestine submarine refueling stations.

DISADVANTAGES

- 17. Reaction to the occupation of the AZORES without PORTUGAL'S consent will possibly result in unfavorable political repercussions in that country and in SPAIN.
- 18. Occupation of the AZORES with PORTUGAL'S consent might invite AXIS reprisals resulting in demands by PORTUGAL upon the UNITED NATIONS for enti-submarine and enti-sircraft protective measures and materiel.

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By RT Date MAY 21 1973

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
19. Occupation of the AZORES with PORTUGAL's consent will probably invite unfavorable political repercussions in SPAIN.


CONCLUSIONS


- 20. The utilization of air and naval bases in the AZORES will contribute materially to meeting the U-boat threat by providing VLR land-based aircraft cover for the presently uncovered areas of the central north ATLANTIC.
- 21. The UNITED STATES should proceed immediately to prepare a force to seize the AZORES in the face of armed resistance.
- 22. If the negotiations for a peaceful entry fail, the UNITED STATES should proceed at once to occupy the AZORES and establish air and naval bases thereon required to meet the submarine menace.
- 23. If permission is granted for a peaceful occupation, the required construction and garrison forces should be immediately dispatched to prepare and secure the necessary air and naval bases in the AZORES.

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
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APPENDIX A



SAFE FILE: Pacific War Council



June 10, 1942

PACIFIC WAR COUNCIL REPORT

Washington and London assignments to Pacific areas, and materiel dispatched to British and United States combat forces stationed in Pacific areas, compared with combined British Empire-United States production.

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& OED letter, 5-3-72

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ALL COMBAT TYPES, ARMY AND NAVY

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:	0	April	May	June	July
	United States		1,811*	1,957	
	British Empire		1,606	1,668	
	(excluding Canada) Canada		84	. 98	
	Total		3,501	3,723	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		235	275	
	Netherlands		_	_	
	China		27	-	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		42 135 10 16	40 106 5	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		129	112	
	India, Ceylon		184	197	1.5
	Australia)		40	40	
	New Zealand)				
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia) 3. New Zealand)		38 17	51 14	

^{*} Actual



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PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
	United States		1,569*	1,613	
	British Empire		1,554	1,619	
	(excluding Canada) Canada		84	97	
	Total		3,207	3,329	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		235	275	
	Netherlands		-	-	
	China		. 27	_	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand 4. A.V.O.		142 135 10 16	40 106 5	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		129	112	
	India, Ceylon		184	197	
	Australia)		40	37	
	New Zealand)				
Washington assignments	1. India, Ceylon		38	51	
to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	2. Australia) 3. New Zealand)		17	n	

* Actual

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
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PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
	United States		167*	202	
	British Empire (excluding Canada)		183	213	
N	Canada				
	Total		350	415	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia				
	Netherlands		-	-	
	China		_	_	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		3 14 —	3 14 —	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		_		
	India, Ceylon		_	_	
	Australia				
	New Zealand		-	-	
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		Ξ	Ξ	

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


MEDIUM BOMBERS, 2-ENGINE

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
=	United States		246*	349	
	British Empire (excluding Canada)		300	303	
	Canada		_		
	Total		546	652	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		15		
	Netherlands		_	-	
	China		-	-	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		5 57 2	17 —	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia			-	
	India, Ceylon			-	
	Australia			-	
P Si	New Zealand				
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		=	Ξ	

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


LIGHT BOMBERS, 2-ENGINE

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
11 k	United States		352*	325	
	British Empire (excluding Canada)		101	112	
	Canada		17	.17	
	Total		470	454	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		121	175	
	Netherlands			-	
	China		-	-	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		Ξ	· ii	
CONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia	6	-		
.7%	India, Ceylon		76	76	
	Australia)		26	20	
	New Zealand)				
Washington assignments to United Kingdom	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia)		16	16	
allocated to	3. New Zealand)		9	-	

* Actual

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


LIGHT BOMBERS, 1-ENGINE, INCLUDING TORPEDO AND SCOUT BOMBERS

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	Мау	June	July
	United States		169*	256	
	British Empire (excluding Canada)		40	113	
	Canada		-	-	8
	Total		209	299	_
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia				
	Netherlands		_	-	
	China		-	-	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		Ξ	=	51
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia				
	India, Ceylon		22	35	
	Australia)		8	11	
	New Zealand)				
Washington assignments	1. India, Ceylon	1	22	35	
to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	2. Australia) 3. New Zealand)		8	11	

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
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PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
	United States		100*	96	
	British Empire (excluding Canada) Canada		195	193	
	Total		295	289	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia				
	Netherlands			-	
	China				
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		Ξ	Ξ	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia			-	
	India, Ceylon		-	-	
	Australia)		6	6	
	New Zealand		*		
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		=	Ξ	***************************************

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
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PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
	United States		535*	385	
	British Empire (excluding Canada) Canada		735 67	755 80	
	Total		1,337	1,220	_
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		99	100	
	Netherlands				
	China .		27	_	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		16 64 8 16	32 64 5	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		129	112	
	India, Ceylon		86	86	
	Australia			-	
T - 2 1	New Zealand				
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		=	=	<u>::0</u>

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
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NAVY FIGHTERS, 1-ENGINE

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
	United States		103*	130	
	British Empire (excluding Canada)		17	13	
<u></u>	Canada		Can	celled	
	Total		120	143	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		-		
	Netherlands				
	China		_	-	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		Ξ	Ξ	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		-	-	
	India, Ceylon				
	Australia		-	-	•
	New Zealand		-		
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		Ξ	Ξ	

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PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
	United States		60*	69	
	British Empire (excluding Canada)		15	16	7
	Canada		_	1	
	Total		75	86	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia				
	Netherlands		_	_	
V **	China			_	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		Ξ	Ξ	2:
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		_	-	
	India, Ceylon		_		_
- Y	Australia)			3	
1. 1. 1.	New Zealand)				72
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia) 3. New Zealand)		=	3	

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


NAVAL RECONNAISSANCE, 1-ENGINE

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
	United States		79*	145	
	British Empire (excluding Canada)		20	20	
	Canada		_		
	Total		99	165	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia				
	Netherlands		_	_	
	China		-	-	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		18 	Ξ	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		-	-	
	India, Ceylon		-		
	Australia		-	-	•
	New Zealand		-	-	
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		=		

* Actual

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NOTES ON ORDNANCE ITEMS

British Empire production includes the Eastern Group (India, South Africa, New Zealand and Australia).

London assignments to India, Australia and New Zealand include London assignments out of United Kingdom production, plus the local production. London assignments of United Kingdom ammunition items are not presently available from the London Assignment Board.

Washington assignments to U.S. combat forces represent proposed shipments to cover established maintenance rates. They do not reflect the initial equipment supplied with previous or future contingents dispatched to Pacific areas. The figures for New Zealand include maintenance of U.S. combat forces in New Caledonia and other adjacent islands in the line of communication to New Zealand.

United States production figures for May are actual; June figures are forecasts made May 1.



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RIFLES (.30 and .303 cal.)

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
	United States		106,600	113,000	
	British Empire (excluding Canada)		63,500	73,500	
22	Canada		13,000	18,000	
	Total		183,100	204,500	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		-	-	200000000000000000000000000000000000000
	Netherlands		-	-	
	China		-	-	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon, China 2. Australia 3. New Zealand*		1,011 72 7,310	519 36 3,600	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		-	-	
	India, Ceylon		38,500	8,500	
	Australia		21,000	26,000	
	New Zealand		6,000	-	-
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		Ē	=	

^{*} Including combat forces in islands adjacent to New Zealand.

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
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PISTOIS (.38 and .45 cal.)

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:	A SECTION OF THE PARTY STATES OF THE PARTY STATES AND A SECTION OF THE PARTY STATES OF	April	May	June	July
	United States		17,834	22,500	
	British Empire (excluding Canada) Canada		7,000	7,500	
	Total		214,8314	30,000	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		-	_	
	Netherlands		-	-	
Y	China		-	-	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon) 2. Australia) * 3. New Zealand)				=
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		-	-	
	India, Ceylon		3,250	-	
	Australia		4,000	1,000	•
	New Zealand		750	-	
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		=	=	

^{*} Assignments to U.S. combat forces not presently available.



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


SUBMACHINE GUNS (.45 cal. and 9 mm)

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:	1	April	May	June	July
SHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	United States		56,500	59,000	
	British Empire (excluding Canada)		75,150	80,200	
	Canada		800	1,200	
	Total		132,450	140,400	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	Russia		20,319	25,000	
	Netherlands		-	-	25002-0015
<i>₹</i> 7	China		1,275	1,020	
to United States	1. India, Ceylon, China 2. Australia 3. New Zealand*		108 651 14	55 325 7	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		-	204 **	
	India, Ceylon		-	- 1	-
	Australia		150	200	
	New Zealand		-	-	
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon, China 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		6,000 3,000	2,000 6,000 1,000	

^{*} Including U.S. combat forces in islands adjacent to New Zealand. a 54 901

^{**} Reallocation out of Canadian production.



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LIGHT MACHINE GUNS* (.30 cal. and 7.92 mm)

RODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
	United States		10,305	11,700	
	British Empire		7,820	7,995	
	(excluding Canada) Canada		3,500	3,500	
	Total		21,625	23,195	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia				
	Netherlands		-	-	
	China		2,624	1,500	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon, China 2. Australia 3. New Zealand **		22 285 8	11 142 4	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		376	376	
Di	India, Ceylon		2,417	525	
	Australia		1,670	15,720	
	New Zealand		300	100	•
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		= -	=	

^{*} Excluding aircraft machine guns.

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^{**} Including U.S. combat forces in islands adjacent to New Zealand.



HEAVY MACHINE GUNS* (.50 cal. and 15 mm)

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
	United States		2,970	4,650	
	British Empire (excluding Canada)		120	145	
	Canada				
	Total		3,090	4,795	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		-	-	
- =	Netherlands		-		
	China		-	-	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon, China 2. Australia 3. New Zealand ***		5 268 11 ₁ 9	3 134 74	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		-	-	
	India, Ceylon		-	-	
	Australia		-	-	
n s	New Zealand		57	353	
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		=	=	

^{*} Excluding aircraft and antiaircraft machine guns.

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^{**} Including U.S. combat forces in islands adjacent to New Zealand.



PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:	2	April	May	June	July
	United States		600	850	
55	British Empire (excluding Canada)		1,300	1,450	ů ů
	Canada		1,180	1,500	<u> </u>
	Total		3,080	3,800	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		_	-	
	Netherlands		-	-	
	China		150	200	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand*		- 3 60	1 29	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		-	-	
	India, Ceylon		212	1718	
	Australia		25	-	
	New Zealand		75 ***	75	
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		=	Ē	

^{*} Including U.S. combat forces in islands adjacent to New Zealand.

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
^{**} Including 50 assigned out of Canadian production.



MEDIUM MORTARS (81 mm and 3")

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
	United States		h31	1425	
	British Empire (excluding Canada)		670	670	
	Canada			-	11
	Total		1,101	- 1,095 	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia			-	1/3
	Netherlands			-	
	China			-	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand *		- 141 21	22	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		-	-	
	India, Ceylon		-	-	
	Australia		150	150	
	New Zealand		300	350	
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		=	=	

^{*} Including U.S. combat forces in islands adjacent to New Zealand.




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RIFLE AND LIGHT MACHINE GUN AMMUNITION (.30 and .303 cal.; 7.92 mm) (Unit - 1,000)

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:	/	April	May	June	July
	United States		648,717	722,097	
	British Empire (excluding Canada)		246,420	261,620	
	Canada		91,500	92,100	
	Total		986,637	1,075,817	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		53,000	51,400	
	Netherlands		-	-	
	China		18,578	10,500	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon, China 2. Australia 3. New Zealand*		4,363 14,937 26,710	125 14,937 11,130	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		London	m	
	India, Ceylon		ammunit	ion	•
	Australia		not availab	10.	
	New Zealand				
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand		-		

^{*} Including combat forces in islands adjacent to New Zealand. as \$ 10 |




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PISTOL AND SUBMACHINE GUN ANNUNITION (.38 and .45 cal.; 9 mm)
(Unit - 1,000)

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
	United States	- I - I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	74,491	84,517	
2 ^C	British Empire (excluding Canada)		4,500	7,200	
	Canada		1,400	2,500	
	Total		80,391	94,217	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		17,500	17,500	
	Netherlands		-	-	
	China		4,000	5,590	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon) 2. Australia) * 3. New Zealand))) 2,494))) 2,494	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		London		
	India, Ceylon		ammuniti assignmen	on	
FG - 1	Australia		not availabl	е.	
20 10	New Zealand				
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand				•

^{*} Breakdown by theater not available.



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HEAVY MACHINE GUN AMJUNITION (.50 cal. and 15 mm) (Unit - 1,000)

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
	United States		136,549	166,992	0443
	British Empire (excluding Canada) Canada		2,100	3,200	
	Total		138,649	170,192	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	Russia		5,600	8,200	
	Netherlands		-	-	
	China		-	-	
	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand *		3,330 11,881 2,517	3,330 11,881 2,517	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia				
	India, Ceylon		London ammuniti assignmen		
	Australia		not available		
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	New Zealand		67621607	•	
	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand				

^{*} Including U.S. combat forces in islands adjacent to New Zealand.




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LIGHT MORTAR AMMUNITION (Unit - 1,000)

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
	United States		730	950	
	British Empire (excluding Canada)		2,040	2,110	*
	Canada		400	450	12.2
	Total		3,170	3,510	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		-	_	
	Netherlands		-	-	
	China		40	40	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand *		- 59 1)414	- 59 72	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		London		
	India, Ceylon		ammunition assignments		
	Australia		not available.		
	New Zealand				
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand				

^{*} Including U.S. combat forces in islands adjacent to New Zealand.



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
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MEDIUM MORTAR AMMUNITION (OF mm and 3")
(Unit - 1,000)

PRODUCTION BY COUNTRIES:		April	May	June	July
	United States		625	625	
	British Empire (excluding Canada)		940	1,020	
	(excluding Canada)		125	125	
	Total		1,690	1,770	
WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		52		
	Netherlands		-	-	
	China		-	-	
Washington assignments to United States allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand *		- 50 39	- 51 31	
LONDON ASSIGNMENTS TO:	Russia		Londor		
	India, Ceylon		ammunition assignment	n	
	Australia		not availabl	le.	1
	New Zealand				
Washington assignments to United Kingdom allocated to combat forces in:	1. India, Ceylon 2. Australia 3. New Zealand			*	

^{*} Including U.S. combat forces in islands adjacent to New Zealand.



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